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TATTVASANGRAHA: CHAPTER XVI.
That cannot be right; as it has been established that all that is born has only a momentary existence.
As regards the explanation that there is only an illusion of simultaneity, due to the quickness of the succession", - this has been already refuted.
Then again, under the view suggested, the clear perception of Pleasure and Pain, in the form of joy and grief, would not be possible; because the view held is that Pleasure and Pain, envisaging Conceptual Contents, are apprehended only by Mental Perception; and Mental Perception is ConcepDual; and what is conceptual cannot make the appearance of things quite clear. Under our view on the other hand, what is regarded as Sense-percep. tion is that which is bronght about by the Cognition brought about by the Sense-organs, which is aided by the object coming into existence immediately after the object of the said Sense-perception.
Further, if Pleasure and Pain were actually apprehensible, their mani. festation would be as something separate, as in the case of the Blue and other things; and yet if they were separated from the cognition, they could not be felt as agreeable and disagreeable.
It might be argued that-"as there is no difference from the Cognition, the idea of agreeableness and disagreeablenere must be wrong".
In that case it becomes established that the existence of Pleasure and Pain rests in their own cognition; because Pleasure and Pain have no other form apart from what is agreeable and disagreeable ; and if it is admitted that the Cognition has this form, then it also becomes admitted that Pleasure and Pain also are of the nature of Cognition itself. Any other form not being admitted, it cannot be admitted that they are mere illusions.
"Agreeable is that which is favourable, and the opposite of this is disagreeable!
The term and the rest' (after Pleasure') includea Indifference.
If then the existence of Pleasure, etc., consists only in the appearance of their own Chain',-and it is not accepted that the same constitutes their apprehension also,—but it is held that their apprehension must consist in the appearance of the cognition regarding themselves,-then, in that case, when Mystics apprehend the Pleasure, etc., of other persons, they should be Just as unhappy as the persons actually experiencing the Pain, etc., and it is not open to you to say that it cannot be so, as they belong to separate chains" : because you do not admit that their continuance consists in the fact of their appearance in the same chain'; what you accept is only the appearance of the Cognition of the Pain; and the cognition is present in the chain of other people also; so that the incongruity remains.
If, as the cause of Pleasure, etc. you accept both-then, inasmuch as the Pleasure, etc. would be present in their own chains', it becomes proved that they are self-cognised. In this way, presence in one's own chain serves to distinguish them from those present in other chains'.
Question :-"If Pleasure, etc. are of the nature of their own cognition, then, how can the said incongruity of mystic perception be urged against those-Mimämsakas for instance, who do not admit of any mystics ?"
