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664
TATTVASANGRAHA: CHAPTER XVII,
TEXT (1330).
THE REASONING THAT IS USED IN PROVING THE NON-CONCEPTUAL CHARACTER OF THE COGNITIONS PRODUCED BY THE MENTAL SENSE-ORGAN, ALSO SERVES TO PROVE THE NON-CONCEPTUAL CLARACTER OF THE SENSATIONS OF
PLEASURE, ETC.-(1330)
COMMENTARY
The Reasoning, etc.--that is, the argument based upon the impossibility of Conventions and so forth.
Even though this Reasoning has nowhere been urged specifically in rogard to mental cognition, yet the Reasoning that has been urged in regard to Cognitions through other Sense-organs,-in the shape of the impossibility of Conventions,-is equally applicable to Mental Cognitions also.
Or, the mental cognition meant here may be the cognition of the Mystic, which is going to be referred to later on. The Mental Perception has not been defined here, as its character is well-known to Buddhists.
What the Text means is that the fact of the Buddhist view of the sensatione in question being not annulled by any means of right cognition, has been fully explained by the Teacher; hence we do not seek to prove it here.-(1330)
The following Text sets forth the Vaishesika view (regarding the exact nature of the sensations of Pleasure, etc.) :
TEXT (1331).
"THEY (PLEASURE, ETC.) ARE NON-APPREHENSIVE OF ANOTHER THING; HOW THEN CAN THEY CARRY THEIR OWN COGNISANCE WITH
THEM? IN FACT, THEY BEOOME COGNISABLE ONLY BY THE COGNITION WHICH SUBSISTS IN THE SAME SUBSTRATUM AS THEMSELVES "-IF THIS IS URGED-[THEN THE ANSWER IS AS IN
THE FOLLOWING Texts).—(1331)
COMMENTARY.
"It is not only that they are not self-cognised; they are not apprehensive of any external thing either; that is, they are of the nature of Cognition. In fact Pleasure, etc. become cognised only by that Cognition which subsists in the same substratum as themselves-i.e. the Soul".
Such is the doctrine of the Vaishesikas.-(1331)
The above view is answered in the following
