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TATTVASANGRAHA : CHAPTER XII.
Even if the subsistent things existed by themselves, - even so, the difficulty remains; because the other party also does not sdmit the apprehension of the Universal by itself. This has been thus declared by them"The Universal depends for its cognition upon the contact of its substratum with the sense organ".
Further, if the Universal could be apprehended by itself, the cognition of the Particular Individuals could not be held to follow from the cognition of the Universal ; because the Particular does not exist at the time that the Universal is apprehended by itselt.
Nor would there be any connection between the Particulars and the Universal, such as is involved in the notion that 'this is the Universal of these Particulars'; as there would be no basis for such a connection.
For instance, if there were a basis for such connection, it could consist either. (a) in the fact of its being manifested by them, or (b) in its being produced by them, or (a) in its cognition being dependent upon their cognition.-(a) The Universal cannot be regarded as connected with these Partionlars on account of its being manifestod by them; because being permanent, it can have no peculiarity produced in it by anything else, hence it could not be manifested by anything else ; when one thing does not confer any benefit upon another thing, it cannot serve as its manifester; for instance, the Himalaya is not the manifester of the Vindhya. The Particulars in the same way cannot be the manifester of the Universal. Hence the notion involved in the proposition is contrary to a wider proposition. If a thing that confers no benefit were to be regarded as the manifester, then there would be the absurdity that everything would be the manifester of everything else.-16) For the same reason, because the Universal is held to be eternal, therefore it cannot be right to regard it as dependent upon the Particulars for its production (c) Inasmuch as there is apprehension of the pure Universal by itself, it could not be held to be dependent upon the Particulars for its cognition. Thus all the three alternatives are impossible.
Hence the assertion that the Universal has its apprehension dependont upon the contact of its substratum with the sense-organ -is not right; because there can be no substratum' for the Universal ; how then could the Universal be dependent for its cognition upon the contact of the sense-organ with any such 'substratum'?
The particle adi' includes such conditions as the contact of the Mind and Soul, and the like (postulated by the Vaishēşika).
Then again, as the Universal is eternal, and hence can have no peculiar features introduced into it by other things,-it cannot be dependent upon anything else. Consequently, if it is capable of bringing about its own cognition, then it shonld bring it about at all times; if it is incapable of bringing it about, then it could not bring it about at any time at all. Whet. evor its nature be capable or incapable--it could not alter it; or else it would lose its permanence; this has been thus declared— Its capacity or incapacity, which reste in its very nature,—who can destroy? As it is eternal and hence not amenable to treatment':-(789-795)
