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626
TATTVASANGRAHA : CHAPTER XVI.
Answer By mentioning the Cognition, etc. etc. That is to say, when the passage, in contradistinction to the Conceptual Content, mentions the Cognition as Sense-perception, it clearly indicates that the Conceptual Content is a property of the Cognition. Thus the meaning of the passage comes to be this - That Cognition, which, through the imposition of the identity of Name, etc. appears as nondeterminate, is Sense-perception; that Cognition, on the other hand, which is determinate is of the nature of the Conceptual Content, and hence it is not Sense-perception; and the implication of this is that Conceptual Content consists in the Idea associated with words as contradistinguished from Sense-perception. In this way the passage has presented the Teacher's own is also other people's views. 1237)
Or, it may be that in the passage under reference, the Teacher las stated only his own view.—This is explained in the following
TEXT (1238). OR, THE TERM 'vishēşuna' ['QUALIFYING ADJUNCT", AS OCCURRING IN THE PASSAGE QUOTED FROM THE Nyāyamukha, ON P, 372, Borrom] MAY BE TAKEN AS STANDING FOR DIFFERENTIATION, EXCLUSION',
-BY VIRTUE OF WHICH WORDS BRING ABOUT THE • Apoha, EXCLUSION, OF OTHERS '; [IT IS CALLED * DIFFERENTIATION') BECAUSE IT DOES THE differentiating (OR excluding) OF THE
UNIVERSAL, ETC.-(1238)
COMMENTARY
In the compound 'vishëşanábhidhayakabhedopachāra' in the passage quoted from the Nyāyamulcha, in the commentary of Text 1237), the term visha sana' stands for differentiation, i.e. exclusion ;-and the Word is the abhidhayala', denoter, of this Exclusion, not of Universal, etc.; and there is 'imposition of the identity of this; in this way is the compound to be explained.—1238)
Objection : "If Conceptual Content is 'Idea associated with words, then it is something having properties, an object; it is not likely for one object to belong to another object, in view of which its negation or denial could be brought about as a property of it ; hence what is asserted is most incoherent. Thus if Sense-perception is free from conceptual content, then how is it spoken of by the word 'Sense-perception'?"
This is the objection that is urged by Bharga, Bharadexija and others, who think that the term free from Conceptual Content' is synonymous with * inexpressible by words!
The Author says that this objection has been answered already:
