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TATTVASANGRAHA: CHAPTER XVII.
Perception; and this absence is proved by the fact that even when a man has his mind elsewhere at the time of the apprehension of the object before his eyes, he does not apprehend the otherwise apprehensible Conceptual Content associated with the name of that object. And the Opponent has urged no criticism against this. Because, even if the two cognitions are actually apprehended in succession, the Conceptual Content is not apprehended; so that the attack does not affect our main position.-(1248)
The following Text shows that the idea of the simultaneous appearance of the two cognitions is entirely mistaken -
TEXT (1249).
THAT THE SAID IDEA (OF THE SIMULTANEITY OF THE OTHER CONCEPTUAL CONTENT AND THE COGNITION) [CANNOT BE WRONG HAS JUST BEEN MADE CLEAR. AND THIS SAME SIMULTANEITY BETWEEN THE OBJECT AND THE COGNITION IS ALSO QUITE CLEAR FOR THAT SAME
REASON.-(1249)
COMMENTARY
It cannot be wrong-such is to be the construction along with what has gone before.
Its idea-i.e. the idea of the two appearing at one and the same time.
As a matter of fact, an idea is regarded as wrong when it is annulled by a valid cognition to the contrary, in the present case there is no such cognition to the contrary, by virtue of which the idea in question could be regarded as wrong.
"How do you know that there is no such cognition to the contrary ?"
Answer: This has just been made clear that the cognition of the object before the man's eyes appears at the same time as the mind is attracted by something else is clearly perceived ; and it is this cognition that is called *Sense-perception '; -wherefore then is there anything wrong in this 1(1249)
It is not only that there is nothing to prove that the idea of the said simultaneity is wrong,-in fact, there is proof to the contrary to show that it is not wrong). This is what is shown in the following
