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EXAMINATION OF SĀMANYA, THE UNIVERSAL '.
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are essentially different do not assume one another's form ; for, if they did, they would lose their own form.-In giving the name of "Inherence to that other thing, there can be no dispute.-From all this it follows that the
staying (of the Universal in the diverse things) cannot be anything different. -(798-801)
The following Tearts proceed to show that it is absolutely incongruous to assume a receptacle' for the Universal -
TEXTS (802-804). IN THE CASE OF WATER AND SUCH THINGS, THERE MAY BE A RECEPTACLE'
WHICH PREVENTS THEIR DOWNWARD MOVEMENT ; IN THE CASE OF UNIVERSALS HOWEVER, WHICH ARE IMMOBILE, WHAT WOULD BE THE USE OF RECEPTACLES XIN THE CASE OF WHAT IS CAPABLE OF BRINGING ABOUT ITS OWN COGNITION, WHAT WOULD BE THE USE OF ANY CAUSES OF MANJFESTATION -AND ALSO IN THE CASE OF WHAT IS INCAPABLE OF BRINGING ABOUT ITS OWN COGNITION, WHAT WOULD BE THE USE OF ANY CAUSES OF MANIFESTATION? IF WHAT WAS incapable YESTERDAY WERE MADE capable (TO-DAY), THEN THE THING WOULD BE IMPERMANENT, -JUST LIKE THE JAR MANIFESTED BY THE LAMP.-(802-804)
COMMENTARY Agatinām!, Immobile_which are devoid of movement. The absence of movement in the Universal is implied by its incorporeality and all. pervading character.
Nor can the subsistence of the Universal in the Individuals be of the nature of being manifested. Because the manifestation of the Universal could only consist in bringing about its Cognition, not in any strengthening of its character, because the character of an eternal thing cannot be changed. Under the circumstances, if the Universal has the capacity of bringing about its own Cognition, then why should it need any other cause for its manifesta. tion -If, on the other hand, it does not possess the capacity of bringing about its own Cognition, then it would not be reasonable to assert its dependence on something else, as by its very nature, the Universal is such that nothing can be introduced into it by other things. If it be held that other things do introduce peculiar features into the Universal, then, like the Individual, it would become specific, and cease to be Universal.
The thing, etc. etc. --The entire category Universal' is held to be based upon the name and notion of existence'. [hence bhana' here stands for the thing Universal, in that sense).
Tlie argument may be formulated as follows When there is no basis for one thing subsisting in another, then it cannot subsist in this latter,-.g. the Himalaya in the Vindhya ; there is no basis for the subsistence of the Universal in the Individuals -hence there is non-apprehension of the wider'term' (which implies the negation of the narrower term).-(802-804)
The following Text sets forth another objection
