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544
TATTVASANGRAHA CHAPTER XYI.
It has been argued (under 924, by Kumārila) that "the exclusion of one Cognition from another is not apprehended ".
The answer to this is as follows:
TEXT (1029).
OWING TO THE TAOT OF ITS NOT BEARING ANY FACTOR APART FROM THE APPEARANCE OF ITS OWN FORM, ITS EXCLUSION FROM ANOTHER
COGNITION' BECOMES DULY APPREHENDED.-(1029)
COMMENTARY.
It is because the Cognition does not bear within itself any factor spart from the manifestation of its own form, that-on account of its being restricted within its own form,-the exclusion of one cognition from another becomes apprehended; otherwise, if the Cognition bore the form of another, how could it be apprehended as excluded from that another?
For that reason-i.e. because it does not apprehend any form other than its own.-(1029)
It has been argued (under 925, by Kumarila) that "Words that are denotative of diverse Universals and those that are denotative of Particulars would all be synonyms ".
This is answered as follows:
TEXT (1030).
HE CASE OF WHAT DOES NOT EXIST, ANY DIFFERENCE THAT MAY BE THERE CANNOT BE REAL; SO ALSO WOULD BE ITS NON-DIEFERENCE ; AND BENCE THE WORDS WOULD CERTAINLY
BE SYNONYMOUS.-(1030)
COMMENTARY.
A poha, being featureless, has no form; and hence it is said that there is no difference among Apohas ; similarly it is said that there is no non-difference among them. Thus there being no really non-different thing how can the contingency of all words being synonymous be urged against us 1-(1030)
This same idea is explained more clearly in the following
