________________
EXAMINATION OF THE IMPORT OF WORDS.
489
The following Text sets forth the objection that applies to all the various theories on the subject :
TEXT (906).
AGAIN, IS ALL THIS MOMENTARY OR NOT? IF IT IS MOMENTARY, THEN THERE CAN BE NO CO-ORDINATION. IN OTHERWISE, THERE
SHOULD BE NO SUCCESSIVE COGNITION.-(906)
COMMENTARY. All this,'Specific Individuality', Universal' and so forth (which has been held to be denoted by words) is it momentary or not-momentary ?
-In the former case, as there could be no co-ordination between what existed at the time of the Convention and what exista at the time of Usage,-no Convention could apply to the case at all.-It, on the other hand, it be held that it is all not-momentary, then,-inasmuch as what is successive cannot proceed from what is not successive, there would be no cognition relating to Words and their Import,-as such cognition can only be successive.
Otherwise i.e. if it is not-momentary (906)
Other people have asserted as follows:-"The Word brings about the Inference of the desire to speak (of a certain thing), as declared in the statement that There is no other means save the Word of inferring the desire to speak."-This is answered in the following
TEXT (907).
THIS SAME ARGUMENT SERVES TO SET ASIDE THE DESIRE TO SPEAK' AS (HELD TO BE) COGNISED THROUGH WORDS. WHEN, AS SHOWN ABOVE, THERE CAN BE NO DENOTATION OF WORDS, HOW COULD THERE BE ANY DESIRE TO SPEAK'?
OR EVEN THE WORD ITSELF?- (907)
COMMENTARY. If the desire to speak' is really held to be appurtenant to the real Import of Words', then it is 'unproven'; because there can be no 'Import of Words in the shape of any such thing as . Specific Individuality and the rest. Hence there can be no real 'desire to speak of any object; as there is nothing to which the word may be related.
Nor can there be a word denotative of the object; this is what is stated in the words or even the word itaelf'.- Shruti' stands for the Word. If the desire to speak', is what is expressed by the Word, then the Word cannot be applied to any external object; as it would not be expressed, like any other thing.—(907)
The idea may be that "there is some sort of similarity between what appears in the desire to speak' and the external object, and on the basis
