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TATTVASANGRAHA: OHAPTER XI.
TEXTS (798–801).
IT IS AVERRED THAT THE UNIVERSAL SUBSISTS IN SEVERAL THINGS
WHAT IS THIS SUBSISTENCE MEANT TO BE I-IS TT staying! OR being manifested ? AS FOR 'STAYING', WHICH STANDS FOR not deviating from its own form, --THIS BELONGS TO THE UNIVERSAL BY ITS VERY NATURE; - ANY RECEPTACLE OF IT COULD NOT PRODUCE THIS IN IT, BY VIRTUE OF WHICH THAT SUBSTRATUM COULD BE REGARDED AS TRAT WHICH MAKES IT slay'. AS FOR preventing its movement (WHICII IS ANOTHER FORM OF 'SCBSISTENCE'). IT CANNOT BELONG TO THE UNIVERSAL, AS IT DOES TO THE JUJUBE FRUIT (CONTAINED IN THE CUP); BECAUSE THE UNIVERSAL IS, BY ITS NATURE, IMMOBILE; HENCE IT CANNOT HAVE A RECEPTACLE-IF IT BE HELD THAT STAYING IS inherence, THAT CANNOT BE ACCEPTED; AS IT IS THE EXACT NATURE OF THIS INHERENCE THAT IS BEING EXAMINED. IN THE FORM OF THE RELATION OF THE sustainer and sustained WHICH SUBSISTS ALONG THINGS NEVER FOUND APART FROM EACH OTHER, SICH INHERENCE IS ADMITTED BY US ALSO.-(798-801)
COMMENTARY
It is essential that the subsistence of the Universal in the diverse Individuals should be admitted ; if it were not, then how could there be, ou the basis of that Universal, any comprehensive notion of one and the same form specifically in connection with those things ?-Now this subsistence of the Universal, when it is there, could be eitlur in the form of staying or is that of being manifested. Staying also is of laro kinds not deciatiny from its own form and having its downward movement checked. The former is not possible in the case in question ; because, being eternnd, the Universal would, by its own nature, never deviate from its own form. Nor can it be the latter ; because the Universal is incorporeal and all-pervading, and hence it can have no movement; so that downward movement would not be possible : hence it cannot be right to assume the checking of any movement.
The answer that what is meant by the subsistence of the Universal in the diverse tlungs is its inherence in these, -would be no answer at all; as it is just this Inherence the exact nature of which is being considered. For instance, Inherence las been defined as the relation of sustainer and sustained that subsists in things never found apart from each other. Now what is being considered is whether this character of being sustained is of the nature of its staying being restricted, or of being manifested. In the case of entirely distinct things, it cannot be right to postulate any such distinct thing as 'Inherence' which can serve no useful purpose ; as such postulating would lead to absurdities, as in that case everything would * inhere'in every other thing. Because Inherence has been postulated as that which combines things which are distinguished from one another; but even when there is such a distinct thing as Inherence', tlings which
