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474
TATTVASANGRAHA: CHAPTER XVI.
the basis of that apprehension, being momentary, is not in existence ; how much less possible is it at a later time, when there is remembrance of the uniforinity of things appearing long after that apprehension 1-(876-877)
It might be argued that," the Convention could be made in regard to that inomentary entity in the series of momentary entities born through the potency of the entity apprehended which appears at the moment that the Convention is made" -The answor to this is as follows:
TEXT (878).
AS FOR THE OTHER THING OF THE SAME KIND WHICH APPEARS THROUGH THE POTENCY OF THE THING APPREHENDED AT FIRST, THE BODY OF CONVENTION IS NOT POSSIBLE IN REGARD TO THAT ALSO. AS TOR SIMILARITY, THAT ALSO IS
ONLY IMAGINARY.-(878)
COMMENTARY. Though at the timo of the making of the Convention, another momentary entity is present, yet, as the Convention could not bear upon it, no Convention is possible; when a maker of Conventions apprehends a Horse, and then remembers its name and makes up the Convention, he does not make the Convention bear upon the Cow that may be present at the time, but which has not formed the subject of that Convention.
It might be argued that—"There is a similarity among all Specific Individualities, and on this basis they might be regarded as one and the Convention made regarding them . The answer to this is . As for similarity, etc. etc. ; that is, similarity is imposed upon things by determinate (conceptual) cognitions; 80 that if these are what are denoted by words, then it would mean that the Specific Individuality is not denoted at all.
Thus there can be no Convention in regard to the Specific Individuality of Things). Nor can it be in regard to the Specifio Individuality of the Word. Because all that the maker of Convention does is to apply to a particular thing & particular Name which has been recalled to Memory: while Memory cannot recall the name that has been really apprehended previously, because that ceased to exist long ago ; and the name that he actually pronounces is not the one that he has known previously; so that there could be no real Remombrunce of it, and what has not been appre. hended by the Memory cannot be recalled by it. Hence it follows that what is recalled by Memory and remembered is only a creation of fancy, and not the Specific Individuality (of the word). Thus there can be no Convention relating to any Specific Individuality. Hence it becomes established that Specific Individuality is something that cannot be named at all.-(878)
The Author next states another proof in support of the view that Specific Individuality cannot be denoted by words
