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472
TATTVASANGRAHA: CHAPTER XVI.
The following argument might be urged :-" The person concerned himself comes by the usage and then, through affirmative and negative conco. mitance, comes to establish the connection between the word and its denota. tion and therefrom becomes cognisant of the relevant Convention."
This cannot be right. No one person can ever come by the entire usago bearing upon any subsequent thing.
"What happens is that having once found that the term 'existing is frequently applied to things endowed with existence, he concludes that the same word is applicable to even unseen things of the same kind."
That cannot be true; as such is not found to be the case. In fact no Convention can apply to unseen things which are endless and which differ widely regarding their being past and future. If Convention were applicable to such things, it would lead to an absurdity.
One really does comprehend snch Convention in regard to the things when he speaks of them as conceived of by Determinate (conceptual) Cognition (which involves verbal expression also)."
If that is so, then it comes to this that the application of words appertains to only such things as are purely fanciful-and not to real things. So that the past and future not being before the man at the time, if there did appear a determinate cognition of those, it could only be objectless, and hence what is made known by it must be a non-entity.--How then could the Convention relating to such things be anything real? We desist from further augmentation on this point.
Lastly, as our Reason is present in all cases where the Probandum is present, it cannot be said to be Contradictory,
Thus it becomes established that words cannot have Specific Individualities for their import' (denotation),-(873-874)
The following might be urged :-" There are certain things, like the Himalaya Mountain, which remain permanently in one and the same form,so that there can be no diversity in them due to Place, Time and Distinction ; -consequently, as they would be present at the time of Convention and Usage-your Reason becomes partially inadmissible '."
The answer to this argument is as follows:
TEXT (875),
EVEN IN THE Himalaya AND SUCH THINGS WHICH DO NOT DIFFER WITH TIME AND PLACE, THERE ARE ATOMS WHICH ARE DIVERSE
AND MOMENTARY, AS PROVED ABOVE.-(875)
COMMENTARY.
And such things '—is meant to include other mountains like the Malaya.
All these are aggregates of many Atoms; hence there can be no Convention relating to all their component parts; also because it has been proved that all these things are destroyed immediately after their appearance. Thus,
