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EXAMINATION OF THE IMPORT OF WORDS.
469
applied by Convention; nothing else can form their import; as if it did then that would lead to absurdities. And there is no object wherein the application of any words has been fixed by Convention. Hence all Verbal Cognitions and Expressions must be entirely baseless.
The argument may be formulated as follows:-When words have not been fixed by Convention at their very inception, upon certain things, they do not really denote these things;-e.g. the word 'Horse' which has not been applied by convention to animals with the Dewlap (ie. the Cow) does not denote the cow; all words have not been applied by Convention, at the very inception to any things; hence the wider conception is never appre hended; that is, Denotativeness is invariably concomitant with being fixed by Convention, and this latter is absent in the caso of words.--(870)
The following Text proceeds to show that the Reason adduced is not unproven -
TEXT (871).
SPECIFIC INDIVIDUALITY, UNIVERSAL', RELATION TO UNIVERSAL', 'SOMETHING ENDOWED WITH THE UNIVERSAL, FORM OF THE COGNITION OF THE OBJECT',-NONE OF THESE REALLY
FIND A PLACE IN THE IMPORT OF WORDS".
-(871) COMMENTARY.
That is to say, when the Import of words is held to consist in an object in regard to which a Convention has been duly apprehended,such import would consist, either (1) in Specific Individuality, or (2) in Universal', or (3) in Relation to the Universal',-the pronoun tal' in the compound 'tadyogaḥ standing for the Universal.-or (4) in 'some. thing endowed with the Universal',-or (5) in the form of the Cognition of the object. These are the only alternatives possible.-In the case of everyone of these, no Convention is possible; and hence it cannot form the Import of Words'.
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Really'-this has been added in order to indicate that the author does not deny the illusory import of words; and hence there is no selfcontradiction in terms; otherwise there would be a self-contradiction involved in his Proposition; inasmuch as it could not be possible to assert that Specific Individuality and the rest do not constitute the Import of words', without speaking of thern by means of these words; so that by speaking of these by their names, for the purpose of proving his proposition, he would be admitting the fact that these are capable of being expressed by words;and yet this fact is denied in the Proposition; so that there would be self. contradiction.
This explanation answers Uddyotakara's assertion to the effect that "if words are inexpressive, then there is contradiction between the Proposition and the Premiss ".-Because we do not entirely deny the fact of words having their import; for the simple reason that this is well-known even
