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EXAMINATION OF THE ULTIMATE INDIVIDUALITY'.
then, as the things would themselves be always apprehended in their unmixed-distinct--forms, the assumption of any further Individualities for the purpose of the Mystics' apprehending their distinct forms would be zzseless.-If the second alternative is accepted, then, even in the presence of the distinct Category of the Ultimate Individualities, how could the Mystics' cognition of the Atoms, etc. as distinct, when their forms are (esc Wypothesi) not entirely distinct-be free from error? It would be clearly wrong. being the cognition of things as what they are not; and the Mystics, in that case, would not be true Mystics, on account of entertaining a wrong notion of things.
Then again, if the distinct cognition of things were not possible without a distinct category in the shape of Ultimate Individualities'-thon, how could there be distinct cognitions regarding these Individualities themselves? As there are no further Ultimate Individualities in them; if they were there, then there would be an infinite regress; it would also be contrary to the Opponent's doctrine that these Individualities are ultimate and subsist in eternal substances; as these other Individualities would be subsisting in the Ultimate Individualities also (which are not Substances). If, for these reasons, it be admitted that the Ultimate Individualities them. selves become the basis of the distinct cognitions of themselves.--then, in the case of Atoms, etc. also, they themselves may be regarded as the basis of their distinct cognitions : why should there be this aversion against them that, even though they have their individual forms mutually exclusive, their capacity to bring about distinct cognitions of themselves is not admitted, while such capacity is admitted in the Ultimate Individualities? We find no reason for this a version, except stupidity.-(814–816)
The following Terls anticipate the answer to the above given by Prashastamati
TEXTS (817-818)
"JUST AS THE UNCLEAN CHARACTER BELONGS TO THE DOG'S FLESH BY
ITSELF, AND TO OTHER THINGS BY CONTACT WITH IT,SO IN THE CASE IN QUESTION ALSO ;--AND JUST AS BETWEEN THE JAR AND THE LAMP, THE LAMP, BY ITSELF, IS ALWAYS THE ILLUMINATOR OF THE JAR, BECAUSE IT IS OF THE NATURE OF LIGHT,—SO ALSO IN THE CASE IN
QUESTION."-(817-818)
COMMENTARY.
Prashastamati has argued as follows -" The Dog's flesh is unclean by its very nature, and other things become unclean by coming into contact with it ; in the same manner, the Ultimate Individualities by themselves are the basis of exclusive notion-on account of their being of the nature of exclusion, -while Atoms and other things become such basis only through the presence in these of the said Individuality.-Then again, even if a thing
