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CHAPTER XIV. Examination of the Vishēsa : Ultimale Individuality'.
COMIENTARY. The Author sets forth the objection against the Category of Ultimate Individuality':
TEXT (813). THEN AGAIN, THE ULTIMATE INDIVIDUALITIES' THAT HAVE BEEN POSTULATED AS EXISTING IN ULTIMATE ENTITIES, HAVE BEEN ALREADY PROVED TO BE IMPOSSIBLE, BY TRE REJECTION OF THE ETERNAL SUBSTANCE'; THEY ARE MERE MOMENTS-(813)
COMMENTARY. The Ultimate Individnalities have been defined as subsisting in eternal substances and as existing in ultimate substances. This cannot be a definition at all; as it is open to the charge of being impossible ; there is no substance that is eternal; it has been already rejected under the Chapter on the Escamination of Substance ; under the circumstances, how could these Individualities be admitted as subsisting in eternal substances 1-(813)
The existence of these Ultimate Individualities' has been sought to be proved on the basis of the peculiar experience of Mystics ; but the Reason in that case is 'inconclusive'. This is what is shown in the following
TEXTS (814–816). AMONG ATOMS, Ākāsha, SPACE AND SUCH THINGS (IN WHICH THE ULTIMATE INDIVIDUALITIES ARE HELD TO SUBSIST), IF THEIR FORMS ABE DISTINCT FROM EACH OTHER, THEN THE APPREHENSION OF DISTINCTION AMONG THEM NEED NOT BE DUE TO ANYTHING ELSE IN THE SHAPS OF THIS ULTIMATE INDIVIDUALITY.-IF, ON THE OTHER HAND, THEY HAVE THEIR FORMS MIXED UP WITH FACH OTHER, THEN, EVEN THOUGH THERE MAY BE DIFFERENCE, THE APPREHENSION OF ABSOLUTE DISTINCTION COULD NOT BUT BE WRONG.--HOW TOO IS THE DISTINCTION AMONG ULTIMATE INDIVIDUALITIES' APPREHENDED! IT BY THEMSELVES, THEN WHY IS NOT THE SAME HELD TO BE THE CASE WITH ATOMS AND OTHER THINGS
ALSO 1-(814–816)
OOMMENTARY That is to say, the form of Atoms, eto. may be either distinct from each other, each having its own specific character, or, mixed up. If it is the former,
