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TATTVASANGRAHA: CHAPTER XIII.
TEXT (788).
NOR IS IT HELD THAT THE SINGLE ALL-EMBRACING UNIVERSAL BEING SUBSISTS IN THEM ALL, BECAUSE NOTIONS OF NEGATION' DO NOT APPRAR APART FROM THE SEX CATEGORIES.
(788)
COMMENTARY.
There is no one Universal embracing several such heterogeneous things as the cloth and the like-upon which the notion in question could be based.--It might be argued that there is the Great Universal (the Summmn Genus) called . Being', and the notion of Negation would arise on the basis of thet" - That however cannot be right; as it is not true; that is to say, you have such notions of Negation as are involved-(a) in the denial of such things as Dissociation from Impurities [' Pratisanichyanirodha, a technicality postulated by the Bauddha, but denied by his opponents] as apart from the six Categories, and (b) in the true denial of such imaginary characters in stories like Kapinjala to which adjunct would such notions of
Negation' be due, which could be regarded as their basis? Surely according to your view there is no real 'Being' (existence) in the case of such things as the said Dissociation from Impurities and the like,
This same argument answers also the following assertion of Kumarita's: "If it be urged that in the case of Prior Negation, etc. there is no Universa! posited the answer is that Being itself is the Universal in these, as qualifier by non-appearance" (Shlokavārtika-A pohaudda, 11); where the last qualification means that the 'Being that subsists in the Negations is qualified by the character of being not-produced.
The objection that we have urged above applies to this view also. Because there can be no 'Being' (Existence, Reality) in the things postulated under other systems, or in character and things created in imaginary tales, eto.-on which basis the notion of Negation could arise in regard to them.
"What is conceived in the case of these things is the imaginary 'Being, which has no counter-part reality in the external world."
If that is so, then why is not the denotation of all terms admitted to consist in mere faney, entirely devoid of any single permanent Universal in the shape of Being Otherwise, if a Universal in the shape of the one eternal Being' be postulated, inasinuch as all such terms as "Being, * Man' and the like would equally connote only the *exclusion of other things, why should there be divergent notions regarding these There can be no answer to this objection.-(788)
It has been urged by the author above (under Text 749) that-'in regard to persons created by imagination, and in regard to dead and unborn persons, ---the notions of Negation appear without any all-embracing basis'. This argument is further elaborated in the following
