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TATTVASANGRAHA: CHAPTER VIII.
-cannot be present in it; because when the wider thing is not there, the narrower thing cannot be there; otherwise the two could not be related as being of 'larger' and narrower' extension. Hence on the preclusion of the capacity for fruitful activity, the presence of existence also cannot be accepted; as the said capacity constitutes the characteristic of existence.
By this method, the non-existence of things becomes established.
Nor is it necessary that the Corroborative Instance per Dissimilarity must always be a real entity; as all that is meant to be shown by such in. stance is that the absence of the Probandum means the absence of the Probans. And this is proved by the more assertion,—without admitting the real existence of any object--that when the wider thing is absent the narrower thing also must be absent,-after it has been recognised in a general way that between the two things there lies the relation that one has a wider extension than the other and as such there is invariable concomitance between them; e.g., the assertion when the Tree is absent, the Shimshapa cannot be there. This has been thus declared :- In the case of the Corro. borative Instance per dissimilarity, it is not necessary that the existence of the objective substratum should be admitted ; as what is intended follows from the mere assertion that on the absence of one, the other also cannot be there',-(393-394)
nilarity.
i tted ; as
other also
The following Text shows that the Permanent Thing cannot have any successive fruitful activity:
TEXT (395).
EFFECTS ARE DELAYED ON ACOOUNT OF THE NON-PROXIMITY OF THE CAUSE. IF THE EFFICIENT CAUSE WERE THERE,
TO WHAT WOULD THAT DELAY BE DUE !-(395)
COMMENTARY.
It is not by their own wish that the effects come into existence or not come into existence; in fact, their being and not being depend upon the presence or absence of the Cause. Under the circumstances, if the Thing in its permanent form were always there, as the cause of all things, then how is it that all effects are not produced at once, being dependent as they are upon the mere presence of the said Cause ? and why should they appear successively-one after the other ? - Kșēpa' is Delay.So that even the subsequent effect should come into existence beforehand. --because its Cause would be there in its untrammelled form.-- just like the effect that the Opponent has in view.-(395)
In the following Text, the Opponent offers an explanation:
