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274
TATTVASANGRAHA: CHAPTER VIIT.
The following argument has beon urged agninst Kumariln's position : In the case of an object cognised through Inference, such as the inference of the dark complexion of the child (from the fact of its heing born of a clark woman),-it is sometimes found that it is subsequently set aside by direct Parception (wlion the child is actually seen to be fair-complexioned);
in the same manner, in the case in question, even though the perinnnence of Things might be cognised throngh Recognition, yet it may be that at some later time, the successive (fluctuating) character of things may be proved through Inference based upon the fact of the effects of the tlung being successive; and the said permanence vouched for by Recognition may thus be set aside by this subsequent Inierence. Under the circumstances, how can the doctrine of Perpetual Flux' be held to be discarded (by Recognition)?
This is answered (from Kumärila's point of view) in the following
TEXT (455).
"A TEIXG, THOUCH COGNISED BY OTHER MEANS OF COGNITION, COULD
BE ACCEPTED AS OTHERWISE, IF SO APPREHENDED BY SENSEPEROEPTION; WHEN HOWEVER A TATNG IS ALREADY TAKEN OP BY SENSE-PERCEPTION, THERE CAN BE NO APPEARANCE OF ANY OTHER MEANS OF COGNITION TO THE
CONTRARY)."-(455)
COMMENTARY. Other means of Cognition i.e. Inference and the rest; such as The child must be dark-complexioned because he is the son of so and so and so forth.
Could be accepted as otherwise, -through the instrumentality of Senseperception; otherwise, i.e. of a form other than that apprehended through Inference, etc.
* Already taken up, i.e. apprehended.
There can be no appearance, etc.' ;-Means of Cognition other than Senseperception, i.e. Inference and the rest-cannot set aside Sense-perception. (455)
Why ao ? Answer.
TEXT (450).
* WHEN A THING HAS BEEN DULY APPREHENDED THROUGH THE TIRMLY
ESTABLISHED HIGHEST MEANS OF COGNITION, HOW COULD ONE EVER HAVE A COGNITION TO THE CONTRARY, ON THE STRENGTH OF THE OTHER WEAKER MEANS OF COGNITION ? "-(456)
COMMENTARY. It is only right that what has been ascertained through Inference should be concluded to be otherwise, on the strength of Sense-perception ; because
