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RELATION BETWEEN ACTIONS AND THEIR RESULTS
307
TEXT (527).
THOUGH IT HAS BEEN REGARDED AS PERCEPTIBLE, YET WE DO NOT PERCEIVE IT ; HOW TIEN CAN WE ACCEPT THE CONNECTION OF THAT
AS THE BASIS OF THE CAUSAL CHARACTER) -(527)
COMMENTARY.
Operation' has been held by you to be something perceptible; as asserted by Kumārila (Shlokavärtila : Shabranityatá33) When the Operation of a Thing is perceived before the Effect, that thing is regardled as the Cause of that Effect, etc. etc.'-And further, that partionlar entity which is of the nature of the Operation'-is it something different from the thing to which it belongs? Or is it non different from it - In the case of all entities, no third alternative is possiblo; and no such alternatives are possible a Fit is both different and non-different, or that it is neither different nor non different!
If then, it is something different, then the Thing itself cannot be the Cause', as the causal character' belongs to the Operation which is something different from the Thing-It might be argued that " by virtue of its connection with the Operation, the Thing also would have the causal character ".-That however is not possible ; because there can be no connection betwoen things which do not help one another. It might be answered that "the Operation is helped by tle Thing".-That also is not right; as e matter of fact, the Thing has no other Operation by which it could help the previous Operation ; if it were otherwise, then there would be an infinite regress (of Operations), whereby the successive Operations themselves would accomplish each other, and there would be no connection between the Operation and the Thing.--If it be assumed that the Thing helps the Operation, without any further Operation, then, why should not the Thing by its mere existence, without any Operation, help the Effect (to come into existence),—for which purposo a different thing in the shape of the Operation is assimod? In fact, there is nothing to prevent its usefulness towards the Effect, by its mere existence. From all this it follows that it is not right to assume a distinct thing in the shape of the Operation'
If then the other alternative be accepted-that the Operation is non-different from the Thing" (to which it belongs),-then it becomes admitted that existence is the only Operation; because the term 'existence connotos only the nature of the thing concerned.
Thus the view that the Operation' (oi the Cause) is something different from its own coming into existence-cannot be accepted.-(527)
Further, in the case of Cognition, it is found that as soon as it appears in tho form of the apprehension of its object, -it operates by its mere esistence; and hence in the case of all Things, the causal character must belong to themselves, without any subsequent operation. This is what is explained in the following
