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310
TATTTASANGRAHA : CHAPTER IX.
of another when the latter is always found to appear in immediate sequence to the former, that is, one thing is regarded as the Cause of another when the latter is found to appear only in immediate sequence to the former. Smoko is not found always to appear in sequence to the Cow, tho Horse and so forth; because it actually appears even in the absence of these animals. - Then again, to you also, who lold Things to be permanent. the said criticism would be applicable--why the sinoko, appearing after the Cow, etc. is not regarded as the Effect of these 1-(631)
The Opponent urgos au objection (in the first hall, which is answered in the second half)
TEXT (532)
" IF A THING THAT IS ACTIVE TOWARDS THE PRODUCING OF AN EFFECT
IS NOT TO BE REGARDED AS THE CAUSE OF THIS LATTER, WHAT TAEN!]"_THEN LET THAT BE ACCEPTED AS THE 'CAUSE OF A THING WHOSE PRESENCE IS ALWAYS ESSENTIAL FOR
THE APPEARANCE OF THIS LATTER.-(532)
COMMENTARY.
Then let, ele. This sentance supplies the Buddhist's answer to the othor's objection.-(532)
Thus it has been shown that even under the doctrine of things being momentary, the Relation of Cause and Effect is quite possible. The Author next proceeds to show the possibility of the Means of the Cognition of the said Relation:
TEXTS (533-535). As a MATTER OF FACT, THE existence and non-existence (or THINGS) ARE ALWAYS KNOWN THROUGH PERCEPTION AND NON-APPREHENSION (RESPECTIVELY),--IT THE VIEW HELD IS THAT THE THINGS ARE APPREHENDED BY COGNITIONS WITH FORMS.IT, ON THE OTHER HAND, YOU HOLD THAT THE THING IS APPREHENDED BY A COGNITION WHICH IS FORMLESS, THEN THE SAME IS FOUND TO BE THE CASE UNDER THE DOCTRINE OF THINGS BEING MOMENTARY. BECAUSE WHENEVER COGNITION IS PRO. DUCED BY ITS ANTECEDENT CAUSES, IT IS ALWAYS IN THE FORM OF AN APPREHENSION HAVING THE SAME COLOUR, ETC. THAT HAPPEN TO APPEAR AT THE
TIME.-(533-535)
COMMENTARY.
Just as the approhension of the Permanent Thing would come about for you, 80 also would that of the Momentary also come about.
