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ON QUALITY AS A CATEGORY
387
the Cause (Soul) being always there in its perfect form, Pleasure and other effects would be produced always ; nor can there be any dopondence upon auxiliaries for a Cause in which no peculiar properties can be produced by anything else; As has been reiterated hundreds of times.-Nor again can an eternal Substance have the capacity of producing effects; as such pro. duction could only be either successive or simultaneous, and it has been oxplained that in the case of an eternal substance there is incongruity both in successive and simultaneous activity --Nor again can the Soul be the cause of the subsistence of the Qualities in question); becouse sub. sistence' has no other form than that of the Subsistent' itself: so thnt if the Soul were said to be the case of subsistence, it would mean that it is the cause of the subsistent thing itself; and this idea has just been rejected. Then again, the subsistent thing being a well-established entity, it can have no cause at All; as there would be nothing therein that could be done by the Cause. Even if the subsistence were something different from the subsistent thing, there could be nothing done by the cause in the latter, as it will linvo brought nhout only the subsistence, which eclypothesi is something different. And thats not producing anything in the subsistent thing, how cond the Soul bo its substratum -Nor will it be right to urge thuat-** in. Aamush * the Soul will lavo produced the subsistence related to the sub sistent thing, it would be a helper of the latter, because the said relationslup is not yet proved.-As a matter of fact, the Soul cannot be regarded as the cause of the subsistence; because an eternal thing can have no such causal potency, -as has been explained before.
Further, the entity (in the shape of subsistence) that is established (by the Soul)-would it be of permanent nature ? or evanescent If the lattor, then how can it be established by something else? It would lose its character. If, on the other hand, it is permanent, then also its establisher (Cause) would be futilo ; as by its very nature, the subsistence would be there always.
Further, as regards corporeal things, it is possible to assume for them, a substratum which prevents their falling downwards; for the things in ques. tion however, which are incorporeal, such as Pleasure and the rest,--theru can be no falling doronuard; then what would the substratum' do for them ?
Lastly, for what cannot be spoken of either as existent or as non-existent, there can be no subsisting at all.
In this manner Pleasure and other Qualities many be shown mualis mutandis to be incapable of being regarded as subsistent; from which it follows that there can be no such thing as Quality
Then again, Budhi has been nccepted by the other party as being of the nature of Jñāna, Cognition,-as declared in the following Sūlra—" Buddhi, Upalatulhi, Jhāna, are synonyms" (Nyāyasūtra 1. 1. 15). Even though Buldhi is of this nature, yet the other party have not admitted any such form of it as is apprehended by itself; in fact they regard it as apprehended by another Buddhi. This, not having a self-sufficient existence, like Colour and other things,-it cannot rightly be regarded even as Buddhi. This is going to be explained later on:-(683)
