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EXAMINATION OF SAMANYA', THE UNIVERSAL'.
TEXTS (727-729).
ALL THAT THE EXPRESSION BEING (EXISTENCE) IS MEANT TO CONVEY IS ONLY THE IDEA OF capacity for action; IT IS IN THIS SENSE THAT THE CONVENTION IS ESTABLISHED, IN REGARD TO THE THINGS IN QUESTION, OR TO ANY OTHER THING, ACCORDING TO THE WHIM (OF PEOPLE). PERSONS USING THE TERM go' (Ox OR Cow') ESTABLISH THE CONVENTION IN REGARD TO THE TERM AS APPLICABLE TO THINGS SERVING SUCH DIVERSE PURPOSES AS
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carrying, yielding milk AND SO FORTH.-THUS IT IS THAT ALL THESE NOTIONS OF BEING AND THE REST ARE FOUND TO PROCEED FROM THE CONCEPTION OF THESE CONVENTIONS, AND NOT IMMEDIATELY AFTER THE FUNCTIONING OF THE SENSEORGANS.-(727-729)
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409
COMMENTARY.
The notions of Being' and the rest can never appear in persons who are not cognisant of the Conventions bearing upon those terms; if they did, then there would be no use in establishing the Conventions at all. Thus it is that the makers of Convention apply the term existent' (Being), on noticing a certain identity (among things) indicated by the fact of their performing similar functions; and it is in regard to such things that the notion of Being appears.
'Or to any other thing' ;-i.e. of the expression Entity'.
Similarly in the case of the terms go' ('Ox' or Cow') and the rest the Convention bearing upon them is made upon their capacity for such actions as carrying and the like. Hence, after the Convention has been made, when people come to use the term, even when the Ox is seen, the previous Convention steps in and the name 'Ox' comes to the mind; and the idea that it exists' comes only later in a clear form. In some casos, through repeated use, the whole process passes through the mind so quickly that every step in it is not fully realised; but it is quite clearly distinguished by persons who have used the term for only a short time.
The whole matter is thus summed up :-From all this, it follows that on account of the intervention of the body of Conventions, the notions in question cannot be said to be directly perceptible; because it is not reasonable to regard as perceived' things that are cognised only indirectly; as such a process would lead to absurdities.-(727-729)
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The following Text proceeds to show that for the following reason also, the notions of Being', etc. are effects of memory, and have to be treated as so many Remembrances, and cannot be regarded as 'Perception':
