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430
TATTVASANGRAHA: CHAPTER XITI.
hensive notion of the Universal' that appears in regard to the pure Univer. sals Being' and the like".
This is wlut is explained in the following
TEXT (778).
THE VIEW THAT " THE UNIVERSAL 'QUALITY' IS THE BASIS OF THE NOTION OF 'NOT-SUBSTANCE' AND THE LIKE” IS NOT REASON. ABLE FOR THE SAME REASON THERE CAN BE NO * INHERENCE IN THE SAME OBJECT' IN THE CASE OF THE NOTION OF THE UNIVER
saL'-(778)
The following Text shows that the Theory in question involves an absurdity also
TEXT (779).
As for ' INHERENCE IN SEVERAL THINGS, THIS IS PRESENT IN NUMBER, ETO. ALSO, JUST AS IN THE UNIVERSALS': HENCE THE NOTION OF 'UNIVERSAL' MUST BE THERE IN REGARD TO
NUMBER, ETC. ALSO.-(779)
OOMMENTARY
If Inherence in several things were the basis of the Comprehensive notion in regard to Universals', then, -as such subsistence in several substances is found in such things also as Number, Conjunction, Disjunction, Composite Substances and so forth.--the notion of Universal should appear in regard to these also: because the basis of sticla notion wonld be equally present in this case also.
As for the charreter of forming the object of one and the same cognition this also is restricted to the universals Being', etc. as appearing in the forms of the existing, etc.; and it does not touch any other Universal': so that, on the strength of that also, the comprehensive notion of 'Universal Universal' cannot appear in regard to the several Universals. Consequently the following assertion of Kumārila is entirely irrelevant :-"The subsistence of one in several different things is the basis of the name Universal' ns applied to Being, etc.; or it may be due to their being the basis of one and the same cognition". (Shlokarārtika-Akrtivada, 24).-(779)
