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EXAMINATION OF SĀMĀNYA
THE UNIVERSAL'.
basis of which there should be such a comprehensive notion as 'this is a Category—this is a Category and so forth':-similarly in the Universal', the Specific Individuality' and 'Inherence', the Universal' Being does not subsist; by virtue of which ench of these could be conceived of as * existing'; because (according to the Vaishēşika) Being subsists only in the three Categories of 'Substance', Quality' and 'Action', -As regards the three Categories of Substance and the rest, the Opponents hold the name to be based upon the presence of the Universal'; hence the fallibility of the Reason has not been urged in regard to these. ----(744)
The following argument may be put forward :-“Even in the Categories named, the property of existence' is present in the form of being the object of the right Cognition that it exists'; so that here also the name is due to something other than the object itself; and hence the Reason is not ramtrue",
The answer to this is provided in the following
TEXTS (745-746).
IF IN REGARD TO THE CATEGORIES MENTIONED, THE NOTION THAT IT EXISTS' IS DUE TO SOMETHING ELSE, THEN, IN REGARD TO THIS
SOMETHING' ALSO THE NOTION THAT IT EXISTS' IS PRESENT ; AND SO ON AND ON, THERE WOULD BE AN INFINITE REGRESS,AND THE CHARACTER OF "HAVING THE PROPERTY WOULD CEASE, IN VIEW OF THESE, THE REASON WOULD BEOOME FALLIBLE' (UNTRUE).THEN AGAIN THE ALL-EMBRACING CONCOMITANCE OF THE REASON HAS NOT YET BEEN ESTABLISHED.
(745-746)
COMMENTARY.
Even if it be admitted that the notions in question are due to something else, the defect of Fallibility' remains : because even in regard to the property mentioned by the Opponent, there is the notion that it exists', which is expressed by the words this property of existence is there'-30 this notion of is-ness will have to be attributed to something other than * Existence' (or Being); and so on and on, there would be an infinite regress; as also the anomaly that other things also would be receptacles of the Property, and hence things possessing that property '; and the result thus would be that there would be no such restriction of number as that there are only sir Categories which can have properties.- If, in order to avoid the Infinita
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