Book Title: Tattva Sangraha Vol 1
Author(s): Kamlashila, Ganganatha Jha
Publisher: Oriental Research Institute Vadodra

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Page 410
________________ EXAMINATION OF SÄMĀNYA' THE UNIVERSAL', 415 TEXTS (740-742). LY THE UNIVERSAL ALSO WERE IN THE FORM OF BLUE', THEN, WHAT WOULD BE ITS DIFFERENCE FROM QUALITY AS A MATTER OF FACT, HOWEVER, NO ALL-COMPREHENSIVE BLUE' IS EVER PERCEIVED. EVEN THOUGH IT MAY BE MANIFESTING ITSELI, IT IS NEVER PERCEIVED IN A DIFFERENTIATED FORM. UNDER THE CIROUM. STANCES, HOW COULD THE Idea AND Name APPLY TO THE INDIVIDUAL, ON THE BASIS OF THE SAID OOMPREHENSIVE NOTION ?-FURTHER, THE OTHER PARTY HOLDS THE NOTION OF THE UNIVERSAL TO BE DEFINITE AND CERTAIN; CONSEQUENTLY, ITS NON-PERCEPTION CANNOT BE RIGHT, AS THAT WOULD IMPLY THAT IT IS INCOGNISABLE.—(740-742) COMMENTARY. Such being the case, there can be no difference between the Quality Blue' and the Universal' Blue; as, ex hypothesi, both have the same form. It might be urged that the Quality Blue' is not something com. prehensive, while the Universal' Blue embraces all that is blue at all times and at all places; and in this sense there is a difference between the forma of the two". The answor to this is that no all.comprehensive Blue is ever perceived That is, as a matter of fact, any such comprehensive 'Bhe' as distinct from the Quality Blue,-embracing all that is of the form of Blue, is never perceived to manifest itself; as all that appears in Perception is a specific * Blue alone by itself. Even in the deterrninate' Cognition, there does not appear any second Blue ; is that Cognition only determines what has been perceived (by the previous indeterminate Perception). It might be argued that," Just as for the Bauddha, the Momentary Character of Things, though apparent, is not actually apprehended in its differentiated form by people with dull intelligence,-60 the Universal also ". This cannot be right; as even so, the theory propounded by you that "on the strength of the perception of the Universal there appear the single identical Name and Idea in regard to Individuals that are diverse", would become untenable ; because it the qualifying factor is unparceived, there can be no perception of the qualified thing; e.g. until the Stick is seen, there can be no such notion as the man with the stick. Similarly in the case in question. Because the idea put forward by you is that Diversities (Individuals) by themselves are beyond the reach of Verhal Expression and Cognition and those diversities, which are by themselves beyond the reach of Cognition and Verbal Expression, would (under your theory) be cognised only on the strength of the perception of the Universal':-how, then, can the Cogniser not perceive the Universal iteelf ?

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