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420
TATTVASANGRAHA: CHAPTER XIII.
TEXTS (750-754)
IN FACT, THERE IS NO SINGLE BASIS FOR THE NOTIONS OF COOK' AND THE REST.-IF IT BE SAID THAT THE ACT (OF COOKING) IS THE BASIS”,THEN, THE ANSWER IS THAT THE ACT VARIES WITH EACH INDIVIDUAL PERSON; AND YOU HAVE POSTULATED THE UNIVERSAL' AS EMBRACING ALL INDIVIDUALS ONLY, ON THE GROUND THAT UNLESS THERE IS AN ALL-EMBRACING ENTITY, THERE CAN BE NO COMPREHENSIVE NOTION OF THINGS WHICH ARE DIFFERENT.-IF, EVEN WITHOUT SUCH ALL-EMBRACING CHARACTER, THE ACT BE REGARDED AS THE BASIS (OF THE COMPREHENSIVE NOTION) THEN WHY SHOULD NOT THE INDIVIDUALS THEMSELVES BE REGARDED AS CAUSES OF IT -FURTHER (IF THE ACT WERE THE BASIS, THEN) THE NOTION OF COOK' COULD NOT APPEAR IN REGARD TO THE MAN AFTER HE HAS DESISTED FROM THE ACT (of cooling); SURELY EVEN THE OTHER PARTY DO NOT REGARD THE Act AS PRESENT THERE AT ALL TIMES,-LIKE THE 'UNIVERSAL'. - IF IT BE HELD THAT "THE NOTION AND NAME OF THE COOK, ETO, IS BASED ON PAST AND FUTURE ACTION ", THEN SUCH AN ACT CANNOT BE THE CAUSE AT ALL, FOR THE SIMPLE REASON THAT IT IS NOT
PRESENT AT THE TIME.-(750-754)
COMMENTARY.
It cannot be right to say that the notion in regard to the Coole is due to the act of cooking; because this Action also is held to be different with each person,-just like the individuality.
You postulate the Universal' As embracing all individuals, on the ground that, in regard to diverse things, there could not appear any comprehensive notion, in the absence of an all-embracing entity. Under the circumstances, if even without this all-embracing character, the Action were the basis of regarding diverse things as one, then why should there be an eversion to the individuals, whereby ignoring these, the Universal has been postulated as the basis of that notion ?
Then again, if the notion in regard to the Cool were due to the Action, then after the man has desisted from the Action, and is not doing any cooking, the notion of Coole could not appear in regard to him. You do not regard the Action to be ever present, like the Universal ', by virtue of which the notion could appear even when the Action had ceased. When one thing is due to another, it cannot appear in the absence of this latter.
Nor can past and future Action be rightly regarded as the basis of the said notion ; because what is past or yet to come cannot be there, and what is not there cannot serve as the cause of anything.-(750-754)
Sharkara-svāmin argues as follows:-" The comprehensive idea of the Cook is based upon the presence of that particular Action which is related to the Universal' (or Genus) * Action'; hence, even after the actual act of
