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TATTVASANGRAHA : CHAPTER XUL.
TEXTS (767-770).
"SUCH NOTIONS (OF NEGATION) AS THE previous negation OF THE JAR',
THE Destruction OF THE JAR' AND THE LIKE, APPREREND NEGATIONS WITH POSITIVE ENTITIES AS THEIR ADJUNCTS AND THE COMPREHEN. SIVE CHARACTER OF THE SAID NOTION OF NEGATION' IS DUE TO THE COMPREHENSIVE CHARAOTER OF THOSE ADJUNCTS" IP THIS IS URGED, THEN (OUR ANSWER IS THAT THIS CANNOT BE SO; (a) BECAUSE THERE IS DISPARITY AND (1) BECAUSE IT CANNOT REST UPON THAT.-(a) THE COMPREHENSIVE NOTION OF THE 'JAR' MAY BE RIGHTLY REGARDED AS BEING DUE TO THAT; NOT SO THE COMPREHENSIVE NOTION OF NEGA. TION', THE NOTION OF PRESENCE' (AFFIRMATION) IS ENTIRELY DIF. FERENT FROM THE NOTION OF ABSENCE (NEGATION). (6) THB NOTION OF THE Cow' OR THE 'HORSE' IS NOT HELD TO BE DUE TO THE
UNIVERSAL. Being, IF IT DID, THEN ONLY ONE UNIVERSAL ' WOULD HAVE TO BE POSTULATED AS ACCOMPLISHING EVERYTHING AS BEING THE
BASIS OF ALL NOTIONS).-1767-770)
COMMENTARY.
Shankarasnimin hun prgued thus:-- "The notio.19 of Negations are never found to be free from adjuncts [the Vegation is always of something); for instance, in all such notions of Vegation as the previous negation of the Jar', 'the Destruction of the Jar' and so forth,—they are found to rest upon Negations Associated with certain positive entities as adjuncts ; which shows that in all cases the notion of Negation has its comprehensive character dependent upon the Universal permeating the said adjuncts; so that there is no 'fallibility in our Premiss".
"Tasyāh of the said notion (of Negation).
The above argument is answered in the words. It cannot be so, etc., eto.. - The compound Vailaksanyátadáshrayat may be construed to mean either (a) because there is the fact that it cannot rest upon that, along with the fact that there is disparity', or as (b) because there is disparity, and also because it cannot rest upon that'.
The first of these two reasons because there is disparity'-is explained in detail, in the words- The comprehensive notion of the Jar, etc., etc.';it is not right that notions of diverse forms should be based upon one and the same adjunct ; as in that case a single Universal' would serve all purposes, and it would be useless to postulate several Universals'. Thus then notions of positive entities like the Jar' etc. may be due to the
Universal' 'Jar,-how could the notions of 'Negations be based upon those Universals', being, as they are, entirely different from these latter in character ? For example the notion of the universal Cow' does not proceed on the basis of the Universal Being.-(767-770)
Bhävivikta has argued as follows:-" It is not held that in every case, the Notion is exactly in keeping with its Cause (or basie). For instance,
