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410
TATTVASANGRAHA: CHAPTER XII.
TEXT (730).
AT FIRST, EVERY COGNITION APPEARS IN A FORM FREE FROM VERBAL EXPRESSION; THEN COMES IN THE BODY OF CONVENTIONS ; HENCH THE NOTIONS IN QUESTION PARTAKE OF THE NATURE OF Remembrance,FOR THAT REASON
ALSO,-(730)
COMMENTARY As a matter of fact, there is no Convention bearing upon the Specific Peculiarity' (of Things); and it is only after one has seen the entity, prior to its determination, only as a point of Specific Peculiarity, free from all contact with verbal expression, -that there follows its Cognition based upon the functioning of the Sense-organ ;-then there comes to the mind, the body of Conventions bearing upon that same entity--then there appear the notions of Being and the rest,-in accordance with the said! Conventions, in regard to the thing that has been seen; and these notions embody all the determination' with reference to the thing, and give verbal expression to them. How can those notions escape from being regarded as 'Remembrance'?
For that renson also,-jebecause they are determined ' as seen. The notions in question',-.e. those of Being' and the rest.—730)
Question-"Whence has this sequence in the appearance of Cognitions been deduced ? " Answer:
TEXT (731). IT IS BECAUSE THE PROCESS IS AS DESCRIBED THAT WHEN A MAN HAS
HIS MIND TURNED SOMEWHERE ELSE, THERE APPEARS ONLY THE VAGUE APPREHENSION OF THE MERI thing APART FROM
ALL SPECIFIC PECULIARITIES. (731)
COMMENTARY It is because the notions of Being', etc. appear in the above-mentioned sequence, that when a man has his mind fixed elsewhere, -i.e. he is absent. minded,-if he sees a thing lying before himself,- until there come to his mind the conventions and conceptions bearing upon that thing, the first perception that appears is that of the mere thing, entirely devoid of all specific peculiarities. If it were not so,-if this first Cognition were in the full-fledged form equipped with the verbal expression and all the rest of it, then, why should the absent-minded man apprehend the mere thing devoid of all quali. fications ! It is not possible for two determinate Oognitions with verbal expressions to appear at the same time.
Thus it is proved that the assertion that "the notions of Being', etc. are positively and negatively concomitant with direct Sense-functioning" is not true.-(731)
