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412
TATTVASANGRAHA: CHAPTER XIU,
notions are due to their connection with an eternal and all embracing Entity named Universal', which is apart from all those,-then what has been cited as the Corroborative Instance would be devoid of the Probandura': because the concomitance of the things with such a Probandum has nowhere been perceived. As a matter of fact, the Oaly, the Goad and such things that have been cited as the cause (basis) of the notion of the Cow being with Calf, or the Elephant being with the Goad, have not been proved to be so. Specially because when theso things—the Calf and the Goad, -revert to the position of their specific Peculiarity', they are not found to be the direct cause of any Names and Ideas, for the simple reason that all Specific Peculiarity' is, by its very nature, beyond the reach of verbal expression. Thus the Corroborative Instance cited is devoid of the Probandum'
If they be regarded as the indirect cause of the notions, then that would lead to an absurdity, becanse indirectly, everything is of use in the producing of everything.-(733-734)
Question-"How is it then that people regard such external things (as the Calf and the Goad) as the cause of the notions (of the Cow being with the Calf, and the Elephant being with the Goad) ?"
TEXT (735).
IN FACT, ALL THESE NOTIONS PROCEED ON THE BASIS OF THINGS LIKE THE Goad, WHICH CONSIST IN MERE IDEA' AND ARE ILLUSORY,
ON WHICH EXTERNALITY' IS IMPOSED.-(735)
COMMENTARY.
It has been already pointed out that the Specifie Peculiarity of Things hich forms the root-cause of the Idea of the Good and such things, is not tonched by an imposition' (or qualification). As regards the
Illusory' form of things, it is a mere product of the art of Imagination ; it consists in mere Idea, and is not an external object. People regard it as an external thing', because they are unable to distinguish between what they see and what they imagine, and hence they regard the form cognised as external'; so that the external existence of the Goad and such things cannot be admitter
Avalambya' is to be construed with ankushādikam'.
What is meant is that the notions proceed to apply to the Goad, etc. which are purely illusory, which consist in mere Idea' and on which the external character is superimposed.
Antarmātra' is Buddhi, Idea, Cognition.-(735)
In the same argument (under 716), the Opponent has introduced the qualification " while pertaining to the Cow". This again is not right; as it cannot exclude anything (and hence is useless as a qualification).This is what is shown in the following
