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TATTVASANGRAUA : CAPTER XI.
being i potency produced in it by a previous apprehension; this is known by the name of 'Vâsana'. Conception '.- If what is meant to be proved is Impression as 1 Qulity of the Soul, then, as such an impression will nover have been found to be concomitant with Romeinbrance, the Roxon would be Inconclusive; and the Conclusion also would be one that is annulled hy Inforence. And inasmuch as its intended sustratum, the Suul, Jux Trency been discarded before, and hence cannot exist, it ulity alsu Wote ha non-existent. This argument may he furinukuted as follows What ? number of things subsist in another thing, they can have no subsistence if the latter thing is non-existent.--.g. the picture cannot exist if the wall is not there and under the Opposite party's view, the Momentuin in question is subsistent in the Soul ;-lience there is found in it # character that is contrary to what is concomitant with the Probandum. Honce what is desired is not proved. Specially as the Soul itself has been previously discarded. Thus the net result of the means of Right Cognition hearing upon the matter is that Impression should bo regarded as being of the nature of an impress upon tho Mind, and not a quality of the Soul. The conse is that whilo the former view is supported by proofs, the Inter is not 80 supported.—(686)
The following Text points oat objections against the third kind of Momentum (i.e. Elasticity)
TEXT (687). THERE CAN BE NO SUCH QUALITY AS ELASTICITY, BRCAUSE THINGS ABN
IN A PERPETUAL FLUX, AND HENCE NOTHING CAN BB LASTING (sthila); IF THERE WERE ANY SUCH THING, IT SHOULD
CONTINUE TO EXIST IN TIAT SAME VORM.-(087) [The name of this Quality appears throughout in this work in the forın Schilasthapake, though the form in which it is known from the Ngãy. Vaishanike books is Stittathāpaka'. That the former forra is not an error of the copyist or the printer is clear from this Teadl, where the first term in the compound is clearly stated to be sthita'.)
COMMENTARY That is to say, the Sthila, lasting', thing, of which this Qulity is muid to be the Sthika', 'ro-establishor,-is that tlung hy itself nollasting? Or is it loy itself lastiny? Only theso two alternatives are possible If it is not-lasting, then as in a moment it will lave ceased to exist, what would be there which the Quality in quostion would re-establish? Ou the other hand, if it is, by itself, lasting,-then, if the thing in question would be existent,-then, as all existing things continne to exist in their own form,i.e. without deviating from it,--the thing would continue in the same form; and in that case, what would be the need for assiuning a re-establisher of it, which would have nothing to do 1-(687)
It might be argued that "Even though all things are momentary, as each of them would exist for a moment, and would continue in the con.
