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EXAMINATION OF THE FIRST CATEGORY_SUBSTANCE'.
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The answer to this is ' In that case, etc., etc.':- Distinct'-i.e. a distinct Category; i.e. it becomes a seventh Category: and this would militate against the doctrine of the Six Categorios':-(573)
Says the other party-"This is what we readily admit ; hence it does not vitiate our argument."
How is it then that you have declared the Categories to be six only ? The answer to this question is anticipated and answered in the following
TEXTS (574-575).
"THE SIX THAT HAVE BEEN POSTULATED ARE THINGS WITH PROPERTIES, AND THE PROPERTIES ARE CERTAINLY ADMITTED BY US TO BE DISTINCT FROM THEM."-IF THIS IS SAID (BY TER OTHER PARTY), THEN (WE ASK)—WHAT IS THE RELATION THAT IS HELD TO SUBSIST BETWEEN THE CATEGORIES AND THE PROPERTIES? THIS RELATION CANNOT BE THAT OF 'CONJUNCTION, AS THIS IS RESTRICTED TO SUBSTANCES ALONE (UNDER THE Nyāya-VIEW); NOR IS THE OTHER RELATION, THAT OF 'INHERENCE', POSSIBLE ; AND NO OTHER RELATION IS ACCEPTED BY THE OTHER
PARTY.-(574-575)
COMMENTARY
"The 'Six Categories' that have been postulated are only those that have Properties; while the Six Categories' in the shape of the Properties are held to be quite distinct; us is found in the following words of the Padārthapraveshaka-*This mention has been made of only the things with properties, without any mention of the Properties."
The answer to this explanation of the other party is provided by the words- Then what is the relation, etc., etc.' ;-Relation-of the Property in the shape of Existence, etc.-with those '-., the Categories ;-what is that relation by virtue of which Existence becomes the property of the Categories ? Without some sort of relation the character of 'Property and With Property' would not be possible ; otherwise it would lead to the absurdity of everything being the Property of everything. As a matter of fact, there is no relation between the Property of Existence and the Categories. Because there are only two kinds of Relation-Oonjunction and Inherence. The relation of Conjunction is not possible in the case in question, because being of the nature of Quality, Conjunction is restricted to Substances only (and Substance is only one of the Six Categories; all those latter, therefore, cannot have con. junction with the Property of Existence).-Nor can the relation be one of the nature of Inherence, because it is held to be one only, like 'Existence' itself; while if the relation of Inherence subsisted between Inherence and
