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ON QUALITY AS A CATEGORY.
371
doctrine); and yet they are spoken of as separate, in the sense that they are mutually exclusive ; and as such they become the basis cause of that notion of being separate'. In the same manner, the Jar and other things also, wluch have been regarded as substance', should be devoid of any such quality as Separateness', distinct from themselves.-Nor can the said notion be said to be figurative; as it does not differ in any way from the direct' notion.-Such is the sense of the Text.
Or, the Text may be taken as showing the notion of being separate' to be not based upon anything apart from the things concerned, and thereby points out the annulment of the Opponent's Conclusion by Inference. This Inference may be formulated as follows:--Things that are mutually exclusive are not the substrata of any such quality as "separateness', apart from themselves,-like Pleasure, etc.,-Jar and other things are mutually exclusive hence this is a natural Reason (for believing that the Jar, etc. cannot be the substratum of any such quality as 'Separateness).
It is impossible for any one thing to subsist in many things. As for Subsistence (which the Naiyāyika postulates as subsisting in many things). it is going to be rejected later on; and hence there can be no such relation as 'Subsistence. An argument annulling the said notion is also available in the shape of the possibility of such relation being not present in Pleasure and the rest.—(652)
The Author next proceeds to criticise the qualities of Conjunction and Disjunction :
TEXT (653).
Conjunction AND Disjunction AS RESTRICTED TO SUBSTANCES HAVE BEEN POSTULATED BY OTHERS AS CAUSES OF THE NOTIONS OF BEING JOINED AND THE LIKE; THESE ARE ENTIRELY
USELESS.- (653)
COMMENTARY.
The Opponent's scheme is that " Conjunction and Disjunction are the bases, respectively, of the notions of being joined and being disjoined: they consist in the contact of what has not been in contact, and the ceasing of contact of what has been in contact and that they are brought about by the action of either one or of both, as also by Conjunction and Disjunction ".
All this is a mere scheme ; and there is no proof for the idea that these are real entities; hence they have been needlessly postulated by the other philosophers.
This argument may be formulated as follows That in support of which there is no proof (no means of Cognition) can never be regarded by intelligent persons as existing',-.g. the Son of the Barren Woman:the other party lave no proof in support of Conjunction and Disjunc
