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370
TATTVASANGRAHA : CHAPTER XI.
tion is called 'Separateness (a distinct Quality-according to the Naiyāyikas). This Separateness' is soraething different from the Jar and other things.because it forms the object of a cognition different from the cognition of these latter, as in the case dealt with before."
Such is the view of the other party (the Naiyāyika). Here also, as in the case of Dimension, the Reason is open to the charge of being 'Unproven' and 'Inconclusive '-With this idea in his mind, the Author adds the following
TEXT (651). THE NOTION OF BEING APART, WHICH IS ASSUMED AS BEING DUE TO THE QUALITY OF SEPARATENESS '; -WHY HAS IT NOT BEEN HELD TO REST IN THE VARIOUS THINGS OP DIVERGENT
CHARACTERS ?-(651)
COMMENTARY. That is to say, as a matter of fact, no such thing as 'Separateness' as distinct from Colour, etc. ever appears in Perception; so that the fact of its being cognised by a cognition different from the cognition of Colour, etc. cannot be admitted. Henco inasmuch as, while being perceptible, the intended quality is not perceived, it must be taken to be non-existent, Nor can it be regarded as proved by the definite cognition this is separate Because those same flings, Colour and the rest,-existing in their owu character when conceived of in relation to other things, from which they are found to be differentiated, -become the basis of the notion of the things being separate?; and hence the said notion cannot prove the existence of any other thing (apart from those things themselves).--Hence the notion of being apart, which is described as proceeding from the quality of
separateness, why onnot that notion be held to rest in heterogeneous and homogeneous characters? That is, it is best to regard it as resting upon that. This shows the inconclusiveness of the Reason adduced by the other party. The compound 'vibhinna, etc.' is to be expounded accordingly. -(651)
The following Text proceeds to show that the Reason cited is present in the contrary of the Probandum alsa -
TEXT (652) JUST AS COGNITION, PLEASURE AND THE REST, BEING DIFFERENT FROM ONE ANOTHER, ARE SPOKEN OF ASSEPARATE', AND HENCE BECOME THE BASIS OF THAT NOTION OF SEPARATENESS), IN.
DEPENDENTLY OF ANYTHING ELSE, SO
WOULD OTHER THINGS ALSO.-(652)
COMMENTARY. In Pleasure and other Qualities, the Quality of separateness' cannot subsist; because Qualities are devoid of Qualities (under the Opponent's
