Book Title: Tattva Sangraha Vol 1
Author(s): Kamlashila, Ganganatha Jha
Publisher: Oriental Research Institute Vadodra

Previous | Next

Page 335
________________ 340 TATTVASANGRAHA : CHAPTER X. of these two forms, it cannot be one, as that would be incompatible with Perception.-(591-592) Question :-"What is that incompatibility (with Perception)" Answer - TEXTS (593-594). IF THE GROSS OBJECT WERE OF THE NATURE OF One ONLY, THEN ON EVEN PART OF IT BEING COVERED BY THE LITTLE LEG OF A FLEA, ALL OT IT WOULD BECOME COVERED, WITHOUT ANY DISTINOTION; -AND ON ONI PART OF IT BEING REDDENBD, ALL OF IT WOULD BECOME COLOURBD RED.–OR, OX THE CONTRARY, THE PRESENCE OF INCOMPATIBLE PROPERTIES WOULD INDICATE multiplicity.-(593-59-4) COMMENTARY. If the gross object were one, then the covering of one part of it would mean the covering of all of it, and the colouring of ono part would mean the colouring of all; as, according to your view, there would be no difference between the covered and uncovered parts, or between the coloured and uncoloured parts. And yet it is not possible for any single object to be poss essed of contradictory properties, -as that would lead to absurdities. Thus the whole universo would become a single substance, and this would involve all the anomalies of simultaneous production of things and the rest. As a matter of fact too, the covering of one part is not seen to lead to the covering of all. Thus the said view is clearly incompatible with perceived facts. It is incompatible with Inference also: For instance, that which is obsessed by contradictory properties cannot be one,-e.g. the Cow and the Buffalo ;-the gross object is found to be obsessed by the contradictory properties of being perceived and not perceived, as being covered' and not covered':-hence there is found in it the contrary of the wider condition, (which makes one-niess impossible).-The contingency of the whole universe becoming one would he an Inference that would annul the notion [of the said oneness of the gross object).-(593-594) Uddyotakaros has argued as follows-"As there can be no diversity in any one thing, the term 'all' cannot be rightly applied to it; then how can there be the use of the term 'all', on the basis whereof all (sarva) of it could be said to be covered ?" This objection is expounded in the following

Loading...

Page Navigation
1 ... 333 334 335 336 337 338 339 340 341 342 343 344 345 346 347 348 349 350 351 352 353 354 355 356 357 358 359 360 361 362 363 364 365 366 367 368 369 370 371 372 373 374 375 376 377 378 379 380 381 382 383 384 385 386 387 388 389 390 391 392 393 394 395 396 397 398 399 400 401 402 403 404 405 406 407 408 409 410 411 412 413 414 415 416 417 418 419 420 421 422 423 424 425 426 427 428 429 430 431 432 433 434 435 436 437 438 439 440 441 442 443 444 445 446 447 448 449 450 451 452 453 454 455 456 457 458 459 460 461 462 463 464 465 466 467 468 469 470 471 472 473 474 475 476 477 478 479 480 481 482 483 484 485 486 487 488 489 490 491 492 493 494 495 496 497 498 499 500 501 502 503 504 505 506 507 508 509 510 511 512 513 514 515 516 517 518 519 520 521 522 523 524 525 526 527 528 529 530 531 532 533 534 535 536 537 538 539 540 541 542 543 544 545 546 547 548 549 550 551 552 553 554 555 556 557 558 559 560 561 562 563 564 565 566 567 568 569 570 571 572 573 574 575 576 577 578 579 580 581 582 583 584 585 586 587 588 589 590 591 592 593 594 595 596 597 598 599 600 601 602 603 604 605 606 607 608 609 610 611 612 613 614 615 616 617 618 619 620 621 622 623 624 625 626 627 628 629 630 631 632 633 634 635 636 637 638 639 640 641 642 643 644 645 646 647 648 649 650 651 652 653 654 655 656 657 658 659 660 661 662 663 664 665 666 667 668 669 670 671 672 673 674 675 676 677 678 679 680 681 682 683 684 685 686 687 688 689 690 691 692 693 694 695 696 697 698 699 700 701 702 703 704 705 706 707 708 709 710 711 712 713 714 715 716 717 718 719 720 721 722 723 724 725 726 727 728 729 730 731 732 733 734 735 736 737 738 739 740 741 742 743 744 745 746 747 748 749 750 751 752 753