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340
TATTVASANGRAHA : CHAPTER X.
of these two forms, it cannot be one, as that would be incompatible with Perception.-(591-592)
Question :-"What is that incompatibility (with Perception)" Answer -
TEXTS (593-594).
IF THE GROSS OBJECT WERE OF THE NATURE OF One ONLY, THEN ON EVEN
PART OF IT BEING COVERED BY THE LITTLE LEG OF A FLEA, ALL OT IT WOULD BECOME COVERED, WITHOUT ANY DISTINOTION; -AND ON ONI PART OF IT BEING REDDENBD, ALL OF IT WOULD BECOME COLOURBD RED.–OR, OX THE CONTRARY, THE PRESENCE OF INCOMPATIBLE PROPERTIES WOULD INDICATE
multiplicity.-(593-59-4)
COMMENTARY.
If the gross object were one, then the covering of one part of it would mean the covering of all of it, and the colouring of ono part would mean the colouring of all; as, according to your view, there would be no difference between the covered and uncovered parts, or between the coloured and uncoloured parts. And yet it is not possible for any single object to be poss essed of contradictory properties, -as that would lead to absurdities. Thus the whole universo would become a single substance, and this would involve all the anomalies of simultaneous production of things and the rest. As a matter of fact too, the covering of one part is not seen to lead to the covering of all. Thus the said view is clearly incompatible with perceived facts.
It is incompatible with Inference also: For instance, that which is obsessed by contradictory properties cannot be one,-e.g. the Cow and the Buffalo ;-the gross object is found to be obsessed by the contradictory properties of being perceived and not perceived, as being covered' and
not covered':-hence there is found in it the contrary of the wider condition, (which makes one-niess impossible).-The contingency of the whole universe becoming one would he an Inference that would annul the notion [of the said oneness of the gross object).-(593-594)
Uddyotakaros has argued as follows-"As there can be no diversity in any one thing, the term 'all' cannot be rightly applied to it; then how can there be the use of the term 'all', on the basis whereof all (sarva) of it could be said to be covered ?"
This objection is expounded in the following