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TATIVASANGRAHA: CHAPTER VIII.
its perfectly perceptibile form, the auditory perception is not there ;-even when the Diamond and other things were there in the perfectly perceptible form at the time of their previous perception, their Recognition does not appear at that time; hence the wider condition not being present (the less wide condition cannot be there).-(b) Thus if the Diamond and other things were permanent, the Recognition of those things should appear on the previous occasion, when its causes would be present in its perfect form ;-and yet as a matter of fact, it does not appear at that time; hence it becomes established that those things cannot be permanent. Thus then, it remains undisputed that since it apprehends as non-different what is different, the Recognition must be mistaken, like the cognition of the illusory Ball. Thus it has been shown that Recognition is not one that has its object not denied ;-[hence it is invalid]; because its object is actually annulled by the aforesaid reasoning which has proved it to be wrong.-(449-450)
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For the following reason also, that it apprehends what is already apprehended, Recognition cannot be valid,-being just like Remembrance.This is what is shown in the following
TEXT (451).
IT CANNOT BE RIGHT TO REGARD RECOGNITION AS VALID,-BECAUSE IT OPERATES TOWARDS AN OBJECT WHOSE PURPOSE HAS BEEN ALREADY ACCOMPLISHED,-LIKE REMEMBRANCE AND SUCH OTHER COGNI
TIONS AND HENCE IT IS DEVOID OF THE CHARACTER OF
THE VALID MEANS (OF COGNITION).-(451)
COMMENTARY.
That active agent alone is called the Means of Right Cognition which is the best implement and the most effective instrument in the bringing about of the action of valid Cognition. If then, Recognition has for its object something that has been already apprehended by a previous Cognition, then, inasmuch as it would be operating towards a Cognition that has been already brought about, it could not be the most effective instrument',-and under the circumstances, how could it have the character of the Means of Right Cognition? If it did, then Remembrance also would be a means of Right Cognition (which no one admits). And when it has not acquired the character of a valid means of Right Cognition', it cannot be effective in annulling any notion. If it did so, it would lead to an absurdity.
"Recognition may not be a separate Means of Right Cognition; and yet the mere fact of its having for its object something that existed at the previous time does annul the notion of the Perpetual Flux of things."
This is not right; because in reality, its object is not the same as the previous thing; in fact it is a figment of the imagination, and even though purely imaginary, it apprehends, through illusion, the previously perceived thing; and by reason of this illusory apprehension, it is said to have the previously perceived thing for its object. Under the circumstances, how can
