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EXAMINATION OF THE DOCTRINE OF THE PERMANENCE OF THINGS. 279
is nothing that is neither Being nor Non-being', there can be no cognition of which that could be the objoct; and its non-characterisation' follows from its very non existence.—Similarly, the apprehension of an inappre. hensible object being impossible, inapprehensibility by such apprehension follows as a matter of course. Similarly inexpressibility by words which are inexpressible also follows from the fact that such words are meaningless.
Homogeneous things are substances, like the lips, teeth and so forth, all these having the common character of being products ; 'heterogeneous things are Akasha and the rest; the muluol conjunction and disjunction of these homogeneous and heterogeneous substances produce the first Sound, and this first Sound brings about, in due succession, its produet in the shape of the Sound that reaches the Ear; and it is by this Sound that things are expressed. The process of sound-production, according to these people, is as follows the initial sound arises from Conjunction and Disjunction: thence proceel other sound wavos, in the manner of the filaments of tho Kadumia fowor; that Sound which reaches the Akasha in the Ear, that alone is heard, not any other.”
This entire set of reasonings is set forth in the following: -
TEXTS (464-465).
" ALL THOSE THINGS THAT ARE THE SUBSTRATA OF COLOUR, ETC., AND THE SUBSTRATA OF THESE THINGS,--AS ALSO THE COGNITIONS THAT APPEAR IN REGARD TO THESE, -ALL THESE ARE NOT, LIKE THE SKY-LOTUS, LIABLE TO DESTRUCTION IMMEDIATELY ON COMING INTO EXISTENCE, BECAUSE THEY ARE
COGNISABLE AND EXPRESSIBLE."-(464-465)
COMMENTARY.
The two reasons cognisability' and 'expressibility' have been mentioned by way of illustration; the other reasons also are meant to be applicable.
* Kharabinda is the arabinda', Lotus, in 'Iha', the Sky,-i.e. the Sky-lotus':-(464-465)
Uddyotakana (in Nyāyavartila on 3. 2. 14, page 421, Bib. Ind. Edn.] has stated the argument (against Perpetual Flux) as follows:-" The Cognitions under dispute, appearing at diverse times, must appertain to the same thing,–because while being rightly co-extensive with the cognition of that thing, it is expressible by the same terms,-like the present cognition of a thing as appearing in various persons":-Here the term 'avyutthāyi' stands for what is not vyutthaya, wrong,-ie. what is right ;-the .co. extensiveness is that of the cognitions of the Jar and such things and the epithet 'right' is meant to qualify this co-extensiveness'; what is meant is that the said co-extensiveness is never sublatod or annulled. This qualification has been added in order to avoid the falsity that might attach to it on
