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EXAMINATION OF THE DOCTRINE OF THE PERMANENCE OF THINGS. 249
successively also. All this is clearly established by direct Perception. Thus Succession being excluded by simultaneity, and vice versa, the cognition that precludes both these functions (the siiccessive as well as the simultaneous) naturally precludes the object also to which those functions belong.-and it also indicates that there can be no third kind of functioning; thus then there is mutual exclusion- contradiction between these two-succession and simultaneity-of that particular kind in which the presence of one implies the absence of the other. Thus no third kind of activity being possible, all fruitful activity of things must be either successive or simulta. neous; and when such activity is precluded in Permanent things by the absence of the more extensive character, it precludes its characteristic in the shape of existence' also. In this way the necessary invariable concomitance becomes secured.
It cannot be argued, in answer to this that-"The succession and simultaneity of the things themselves have not yet been proved, inasmuch as Time is not postulated by us as a distinct entity."--It will not be right to argue thus, because we do not say that the succession and simultaneity' of things are due to a distinct category in the shape of Time; what we mean is that it is due to their coming into existence in those ways. For instance, when it so happens that when one comes into existence, the others also come into existence similarly, then they form the basis of the notion of non-succession' or 'simultaneity'; as is found in the case of several sprouts coming out from similar causal conditions ;-when, on the other hand, things appear in a different manner, they are spoken of as successive '; e.g., such things as the sprout, the stern, the leaves, and so forth.-Al these are clearly recognised by direct perception, and are spoken of as such by people. The functioning of Causes also towards the bringing about of such things is similarly spoken of as successive or simultaneous'. Thus the objection that has been urged cannot be rightly urged against us.
Says the opponent "In case the Thing were proved to be permanent, the preclusion of succession and simultaneity might not imply the preclusion of fruitful activity ; e.g when the existence of the Tree ' becomes precluded in regard to a certain place, it preclucies the particular tree * shimshapi'; otherwise, if the place itself were unknown where could the absence of the shimshapă be cognised As a matter of fact, the permanent thing itself does not exist (for you, the Buddhist), as this is what you wish to deny. If, however, you do admit that such a permanent thing does exist, then it cannot be right to deny it, since you admit its existence as the substratum (of the two kinds of activity). Thus your reason because it has existence becomes 'inconclusive ', as it is found to be present also in the contrary of your Probandum ("Momentary ')."
It is not so, we reply. When we urge the non-perception of the more extensive character as proving our negative conclusion, we do not urge it as an independent valid cognition ; we put it forward only in the form of a Reductio ad absurdum against the opponent ; the sense being if you accepe the permanence of the thing, then, you cannot admit its fruitful activity, as succession and simultaneity', which are of larger extension, and with which the said succession and simultaneity' are invariably concomitant,
