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TATTVASANGRAHA : CHAPTER VIII.
ence and the like is known to subsist between them; the phase and the like'is meant to include 'existence. If any such relation as Inherence and the like were known to subsist between them, then Inherence' might be the character. istic feature of 'entities '; as a matter of fact however, it is exactly those relations whose existence the opponent has set out to prove; and also ho. cause there are valid proofs to the contrary. Or even the proofs already adduced before may be regarded as setting aside existence' (Being) as well as "Inherence'. The reason for this lies in the fact that 'Existence or "Being can have no relation with anything, as it cannot be helped by anything; and there can be no relation between things that are not helpful to one another; if there were such relation, it would lead to an absurdity. -Further, it behoves you to explain what is the characteristic feature of
Being (Existence), Inherence' and of the ultimate specific Individua. lities, which feature marks them out as 'entities. As a matter of fact
Existence' (or Being ') does not inhere (subsist) in either Inherence' or in the ultimate specific Individualities '; nor does it subsist in Being or 'Existence itself. In fact, the theory (of the opponent) is that what the prosence of existence (or Being) marks out as 'entities are only the three categories of Substance, Quality and Action.-Thus the characteristic foature proposed is found to be too narrow (not applicable to all the things in question).
Even granting that such entities as Existence and the rest do exist ;-the inherence of existence cannot be the characteristic feature of entities ; because it is an entirely different thing; when one thing is entirely different from another, it cannot constitute the form of the latter; and thereby serve as its characteristic feature. Thus, when a person is found whose mind is bewildered by his ignorance of the real character of
entities', if a definition of their characteristic feature is provided, what should be pointed out as the required feature is some character in the thing in question itself which serves to differentiate it from something else; so that through that character, the nature of the thing could be determined; e.g. the Earth is distinguished as characterised by roughness of surface. One thing cannot constitute the form of another thing: for if it did, then it would not be another thing at all; how then could it form its characteristic feature 1 Specially because the term characteristic feature in the present context stands for the nature or character of things.-(418)
Some people argue as follows: "That entity which in its ultimate form does not bring about any cognition even for the Omniscient Person,what would be the proof that would establish the non-existence of such an entity,-by virtue of which such a universal proposition could be asserted that whatever exists is momentary'? Nor would the non-cognition of such an entity vitiate the omniscient character of that Person, as His omniscience applies to only such things as are cognisable; it is only when a man doos not know what is knowable, that he is regarded us not onnisciant; while the said entity is not knowable ; because, even though its cognition could be produced, it would remain incapable of being cognised,"
Against these people, the author directs the following remarks :
