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EXAMINATION OF THE DOUTRINE OF THE PERMANENCH OF THINGS. 261
TEXTS (419-421).
ALL OPERATIONS BEARING UPON THE CONSIDERATION OF THINGS ARE TO BE CARRIED ON BY ONE WHO HAS AN UNDISTURBED INTELLECT AND SEEKS TO ACCOMPLISH A USEFUL PURPOSE, -NOT BY ONE WHO IS DEMENTED. HENCH IT WOULD BE RIGHT TO DETERMINE THE EXISTENCE OF ONLY SUCH A THING AS WOULD BE OF USE TO SOME PEOPLE, AT SOME PLACE, AT SOME TIME AND IN SOME WAY. IT IS IN REFERENCE TO SUCH A THING THAT WE ARE PROVING THE momentariness ; AND IT IS ONLY WITH REFERENCE TO SUCH THINGS THAT THE UNIVERSAL PREMISS HAS
BEEN ASSERTED.-(419-421)
COMMENTARY
Whenever there is any consideration as to anything being existent or non-existent, it is done by one who seeks to accomplish some useful purpose, -and not because he is addicted to the habit of considering things; as otherwise he would be regarded as u demented person. Henco an intelligent person can seek to determine the existence of only such things as could be of use to persons sooking to accomplish a useful purpose, in some way, directly or indirectly, at some place, and at some time ; and not anything else ; as there would be no basis for such consideration, and no useful purpose would be served by it.
The term 'adi' is meant to include the consideration of such particular things as Fire, Wator and the like.
Thus what we are trying to prove is the momentary character of only those things which are capable of accomplishing some useful purpose of intelligent men, and which alone are known as "entity', 'thing', and which have the said character of being capable of accomplishing a zseful purpose. And as what we have cited as the Reason is the capacity for fruitful action', there is no fallibility in such a Reason, and it is only such a Reason which is found to be actually invariably concomitant, in the universal form, with the Probandum (Momentarinens). That Premiss is said to be 'universal which asserts the universal concomitance of the Reason, without any distinetion between what is actually known to contain the Probandum and what is not so lenown.-(419-421)
The following texts answer the question why the character of entity', *thing,' cannot be attributed to what is devoid of the capacity for effective actions
