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258
TATTVASANGRAHA : CHAPTER VITI.
Or does it continue to exist 2-These are the only two alternatives possible.If it is held that it disappears, then that establishes its momentary character: as at each moment fresh natures would be appearing, one after the other, each preceding nature becoming destroyed by itself.-(414)
TEXTS (415-416).
IF, ON THE OTHER HAND, THE FORM OF THE EFFICIENT CAUSE CON"TINUES AFTER HAVING BROUGHT ABOUT THE EFFECTS), THEN IT SHOULD PRODUCE THE EFFEOT OVER AGAIN, BECAUSE, HOW COULD ANY EFFICIENCY BE ATTRIBUTED TO WHAT IS NOT EFFECTIVE IN BRINGING ABOUT DUH EFFECTS? THUS ALL THINGS WOULD BE NON-EXISTENT AND MOMENTARY,-LIKE THE SKY-LOTUS ',-ON ACCOUNT OF THEIR BEING DEVOID OF ALL efficiency; BECAUSE-IT IS efficiency (FOR EFFECTIVE ACTION) THAT CONSTITUTES THE CHARACTERISTIC OF
(EXISTING) * THINGS'.-(415-416)
COMMENTARY.
If the second alternative is accepted, then, as the form of the thing. in the shape of its causal efficiency, would continue.-it should produce its effect over again; because it will not have abandoned its previous form, just like its previous condition, and thus there would come about the same succession of effects. This shows that the doctrine of simultaneity is contrary to Inferential Reasoning.
It might be argued that,"It may be that the effective action of the Permanent Thing is neither successive or simultaneous; and yet its efficiency mny be there all the same."
In answer to this, it is said- How could any efficiency, etc. etc.'-When the efficiency of things is determined, it is only on the basis of their bringing about their effects, so that when a thing does not bring about any effect, how could it be efficient ? Otherwise, why could not officiency be attributed to the sky-lotus' and other such things also ?
Says the Opponent—"Even though the efficiency of the Thing has disap. peared, the existence of the Thing is still there (it still exists); and as it would be in existence, your Reason becomes Inconclusive."
Answer: Thus all things could be non-existent, etc. etc. The only characteristic of an sisting thing is that it should have the capacity for effective action; if this capacity has disappeared, how could existence, the characteristio feature of the entity, remain there?
