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248
TATTVASANGRAHA : CHAPTER VIII.
TEXTS (392-394).
For INSTANOB, WHATEVER THINGS ARE EXISTENT ARE ALL IN A STATE OF PERPETUAL FLUX-JUST AS ALL CREATUD THINGS HAVE JUST BEEN SHOWN TO BE THESE THINGS, Akasha, TIME, GOD, AND THE REST ARE HELD BY YOU TO BE existent; THESE COULD NEVER HAVE AN EXISTENCE IF THEY WERE DEVOID OF momentariness ; -BECAUSE PERMANENT THINGS CANNOT HAVE ANY FRUTTFUL ACTIVITY, EITHER SUCCESSIVELY OR SIMULTANEOUSLY, THEREFORE THEY ARE HELD TO BE non-existent.
—(392-394)
COMMENTARY.
The reasoning may be thus formulated :-What is existent must be momentary,--like the things just shown to be momentary ;-Alāsha and other (uncreated) things are held by you to be existent; this is therefore a natural reason (for regarding them as momentary).
As have been shown to be i.e. as momentary.
This shows that the Corroborative Instance is not devoid of the Proban. dum, as its presence has been already established.
Reld by you';-this is meant to indicate that the reasoning here put forward is an indirect one, in the form of a Reductio ad absurdum. Otherwise the Reason cited would be one that is not admitted by one or the other of the two parties.
Question-"In what way is the invariable concomitance of the Reason (with the Probandum) established !"
Answer :- If they were devoid of momentariness, etc.; the existence' that is meant to be the Reason here is that which consists in "capacity for fruitiul action'; and this 'existence 'must be absent, it 'momentariness' is absent; because when things perform a fruitful act, they do it either successively and simultaneously, there is no other way of acting except successively and simultaneously; as these two are mutually exclusive, as is clearly perceived; for instance, the Jar is not perceived, at one and the same time, to perform the successive functions of containing wine, water and other liquids as apart from one another, and also the simultaneous functions of bringing about its own cognition and also containing water, at one and the same time - now those various acts that the Jar is seen to perform successively,-or the Potter is seen to make the Jar, the plates and other objects-all those it or he is not able to do or make simultaneously. When too the Jar is found to produce its own cognition and other things at ono and the same time, it is not, at that same time, found to produce those samo
