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184
TATTVASANGRAHA : CHAPTER VII.
truction and origination would be irrepressible. The argument is to be formulated as follows:-When one thing is non-different from another, its destruction and origination must follow on the destruction and origination of the latter, just like the specific forms of those same States of Happiness and the rest, and the Soul has been lield to be non-different in nature from the States of Happiness and the rest; hence this is a reason based upon the nature of things.-(268)
The following Text shows that the Reason just put forward is not * Inconclusive
TEXT (269).
IF THERE BE PRESENCE OF CONTRADICTORY PROPERTIES, THEN THERE SHOULD BE ABSOLUTE DIFFERENCE; JUST AS IN THE CASE OF YOUR SOULS WHICH ARE ABSOLUTELY DIFFERENT FROM EACH OTHER, THROUGH THE DISTINCTIVE CHARACTER
BELONGING TO EACH OF THEM,—(269)
COMMENTARY.
If it bo lield that destruction and origination pertain to the States only, not to the Soul.-30 that the two (the States and the Soul) have two contradictory properties-of origination' and 'non-origination, then there must be difference between them : just as in the case of Souls, which are many,each has its own character restricted to himself, -and hence they are regarded as distinct from each other; that is, this much alone serves as the basis of difference.
The qualification distinctive character belonging to each' has been added for the purpose of avoiding the fallacy of the absence of the Probandum in the Probans, due to the fact that in the case of the Souls also, there is no difference in their own pristine forms. As a matter of fact, the form belong. ing to each of the individual Souls is entirely different from each other; if that were not so, as there would be no restriotion regarding the apprehensions and remembrances of different persons, there would be confusion in all matters.
The argument may be formulated as follows:-When one thing is not subject to the same vicissitudes as another, there cannot be non-difference between them;-.g. among Souls, each having its own distinctive form restricted to itself, they are not subject to the same vicissitudes,-the States of Happiness and the rest also are not all subject to the same vicissitudes;
-hence, inasmuch as the wider condition is not found in them (they oannot be non different).-(269)
It has been asserted that "on the appearance of another State, the preceding State is not entirely destroyed ";--the following Text supplies the answer to this:
