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188
TATTVASANGRAHA: CHAPTER VII.
TEXT (277)
Ir TRIS WERE NOT SO, THE OBJECTION IN QUESTION COULD BE URGED WITH EQUAL FORCE AGAINST YOUR SOUL' ALSO; BUT ALL DIFFICULTIES ARE REMOVED BY THE FACT THAT THERE
IS DIVERSITY IN ITS POTENCIES.-(277)
COMMENTARY
Further, even when the I notion 'is held to have the Soul for its basis, the objection in question would apply with equal force Why does the said notion not appear in connection with another Soul also I-It might be answered that it is not so because of the restrictions imposed by the potency of things " then, for us also the same answer would be available,that the notion appears only in regard to some internal objects, and not in regard to all. So that all difficulties would be removed. -(277)
It might be urged that "There may be such restriction ; but how is the fact of its having no real basis proved ?"
The answer is supplied by the following: -
TEXTS (278-279).
IF THE SAID NOTION (OF I') HAD AN ETERNAL THING FOR ITS BASIS,
THEN ALL'I-NOTIONS' WOULD COME ABOUT ALL AT ONCE,
AS THEIR EFFICIENT CAUSE WOULD BE ALWAYS PRESENT. - IF IT HAD A NON-ETERNAL BASIS, THEN ALL THESE
NOTIONS WOULD BE EQUALLY CLEARLY MANIFEST. HENCE (IT FOLLOWS THAT) THE OTHER PARTIES NEEDLESSLY RAISE QUESTIONS REGARDING THE EXISTENCE OF THE BASIS OF THE SAID
I-XOTION -(278-279)
COMMENTARY.
The basis (background) of this 'I-notion could be either eternal or non-etorual ;-if it is eternal, then all I-notions' - I-consciousness-would come about (appear) simultaneously, as their cause would be present in its perfect condition; nor can the said basis be without cause; as such an idea would lead to abgurdities-norcan an efficient cause stand in need of auxiliary causes all this has been discussed more than once.-Nor can it be urged that " there is only one I-consciousness”, because its multiplicity is clearly proved by its appearing only occasionally. For instance, during the states of deep sleep, or of intoxication, or of swoon, there is no 'I-consciousness felt, and yet at other times, it is actually felt; and this non-apprehension of it at certain times shows that it appears only occasionally; and because it
