________________
200
TATTVASANGRAHA : CHAPTER VII.
be insentient,-e.g. Taste etc. ;-Cosmic Intellect is so characterized; hence this must be a reason based upon the nature of things (for regarding it as insentienu). "-(303)
The following Text answers this argument
TEXT (304).
IF THE REASONS ADDUCED ARE MEANT TO BE SELF-SUFFICIENT, THEN
THEY ARE not admitted BY BOTH (PARTIES); IF THE REASONS ARE MEANT TO BE INDIRECT, THEN THERE IS NOTHING TO ANNUL
THE CONTRARY CONCLUSION.-(304)
COMMENTARY
The reason that has been put forward, -is it meant to prove the conclusion directly or indirectly (per Reductio ad absurdum) - If directly, then the Reason adduced is not admitted by either one or the other of the two parties; for instance, the producibility of things that the Buddhist adimits is in the form of the production of something that did not exist before. --similarly, the perishability of things that the Buddhist admits is of the nature of complete destruction-while such is not the producibility' or 'perishability that is admitted by you, the Sankhya ; as you regard them as being of the nature of appearance and "disappearance respectively; and the form in which you admit these is not the one that is admitted by the Buddhist ; hence the reason comes to be 'not admitted by either one or the other party. The mere admission of the verbal expression does not prove the admission of the Reason; the admission of a fact is proved by a fact, as it is only a fact that can be the cause. This has been thuis declared-'In the case of much fallacies as Falsity and the like: even though the verbal expression may be quite correct, the Reason may be regarded as fallacious, as it is only a fact that can prove a fuct.
If it be held that the Renson adduced is meant to prove the conclusion indirectly, even so, inasmuch as no reason has been adduced which would annul (and make impossible) a conclusion contrary to the one intended, the two reasons adduced must be regarded as 'inconclusive. What is there, for instance, to obstruct the notion that 'producibility and perishability' belong to Sentience?
As for the assumption of the Sankhya in the following Karika-"As the insentient milk flows out for the growth of the Calf, so does Primordial Matter act towards the liberation of the Spirit" (Sankhya-Karika, 57),-thig is not a sound assumption at all; because it is not independently by itself that the Milk flows for the Calf's growth; what happens is that the milk is produced by particular causes functioning occasionally; and when produced, the milk becomes the means of the calf's growth; and it is in this sense that it is said that even the insentient thing acts!. No such activity however is possible for Primordial Matter; because, inasmuch as Primordial
