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242
TATTVASANGRAHA : CHAPTER VIIT.
Why then should our doctrine involve the absurdity of all things being eternal ? If the Destruction of things', in the forn of the negation of their character, were non-existent, then alone the things would be eternal; as & matter of fact, however, the Destruction in the shape of the negation of character, though itself negative in character, is actually there;-how then could the things be eternal ?
As for the notion of all properties being destructible, -the basis for this has been already explained.-(382)
It has been argued by the Opponent (under Text 372, above) that If the Destruction of the thing be eternal, then it would be co-existent with the Thing itself. This is answered in the following -
TEXTS (353-384).
WHEN IT IS ASSERTED THAT DESTRUCTION IS OF THE NATURE OF CESSATION, IT DOES NOT MEAN THE AFFIRMATION OF ITS POSITIVE CHARACTER IT ONLY DENIES THE CONTINUITY OF THE PARTICULAR FORM OF THE THING BEYOND ONE MOMENT. THUS NO LASTING FORM IS AFFIRMED IN REGARD TO THE ANNIHILATION, AND THERE IS NO ROOM FOR THE ALTERNATIVE THAT IT IS elernal.-(383-384)
COMMENTARY, When it is said that there is cessation, it does not mean the affirmation of the positive form of cessation' in regard to Annihilation', for the simple reason that it has uo positive form; it means only the denial of the continuity of the particular form of the Thing beyond one moment. Thus there is no room for the alternative that it is something absolutely eternal ; because, on account of its having no character at all, it is impossible for it to have & permanent form. Specially because the properties of eternality or noneternality are invariably concomitant with the nature of things.
It has been argued by Uddyotakara (under Text 371, above) to the effect that-"Under your view, what is without Cause may be either eternal or non-existent, ete."--But this assertion is based upon his ignorance of the doctrine of his opponent. As a matter of fact, for Bauddhas who are fully conversant with Logic, what is without cause must be non-existent; this has been thus declared by the Blessed Lord The Wise One seeking for the common property among similar things does not perceive any such property in the slightest form':--As for the Vaibhâsikas (a particular sect among Buddhists), who posit such existent things as Akasha and the rest, they are converts to your view, and they cannot be regarded as Followers of the Buddha ; hence the putting forward of their view cannot be relevant.
Thug all causes of Destruction being inefficacions, our Reason (put forward under Texts 353-366) cannot be said to be 'Unproven'.
