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(D) DOCTRINE OF SOUL' ACCORDING TO THE DIGAMBARA JAINAS. 211
them because for an eternal entity, any fruitful action, either simultaneous or consecutivo, is incompatible. In fact, fruitful action in the case of things is possible only when they are liablo to appearance and disappearance Thus, through Inference also, it becomes established that those things which are capable of fruitful action are without Soul', this being indicated by their mere e cistence.-(324)
Against what the Buddhist has said under Text 322 above, the author an. ticipates the following objection from the opponent's (Jaina's) standpoint :
TEXT (325).
IT MIGHT BE URGED THAT "WHAT exists IS THE MIXED FORM OF THT
SUBSTANCE AND THE SUCCESSIVE FAUTORS';-BECAUSE IT IS HELD TO BE DUAL IN TORM, BUT IMPARTITE, LIKIO
Narasimha."-(325)
OOMMENTARY.
Mixed' -- joined together; that is why the form of the Substance', though existent, is not perceived The next sentence explains the reason for its being thus 'mixed' in character: Because it is held to be etc.,-.. because the Soul and other things, though dual in form, are held to be im. partite,-like Narasimha, and because the Soul is impartite, therefore it exists in the joint dual form, and hence is not perceived separately.-(325)
That this assertion (of the Jaina) involves self-contradiction is pointed out in the following
TEXT (326).
THE ASSERTION THAT A CERTAIN THING IS OF DUAL FORM' CAN BE BASED ON THE EXISTENCE OF SEVERAL THINGS, BECAUSE THE
TERAETORM CONNOTES nature.—(326)
COMMENTARY.
If the thing is impartite', then, to speak of it as of dual form is a contradiction in terms; because such an assertion can be based only upon the existence of several things; because when a thing is spoken of es dui. rupa', of dual form', what is meant is that it has two forms-two natures'; and one and the samo thing cannot have two natures'; as that would deprive it of its one-ness. What you have proved is only that there are two forms or characters, and not that there is a single entity with two forms , and that for the simple reason that the characters of being one and being many are mutually contradictory and preclusive.-(326)
As regards Narasimha, he is one only and is not regarded as of dual form', this is pointed out in the following
