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196
TATTVASANGRAHA: CHAPTER VII.
The answer to that is that Primordial Matter cannot stand in need of anything elst.-Merit is a product of Primordial Matter, and as such nondifferent from it; consequently it must be always present; and the desired fruit must therofore always appear. For instance, all things (for the Sūrichya) are ineluded under the two categories of 'Primordial Matter' and 'Soul', and these are always close to one another; so that the fruit should be always there.
Then again, if it is the desired fruit that Primordial Matter brings to the Soul, why then does it present to him what is undesirable ? For certainly no one desires what is undesiruble.-(293)
Further, if Primordial Matter presents the thing to the Soul,-even ko, it cannot be right to regard him as the enjoyer', as he is unmodifiable.This is what is pointed out in the following
TEXTS (294-295).
Ir, AT THE TIME OF HIS ENJOYING A THING, THERE IS NO MODIFICATION
IN THE SOUL, THEN HE CANNOT BE THE enjoyer; NOR CAN PRIMORDIAL MATTER BE OF ANY SERVICE TO HIM.-IF (ON THE OTHER HAND) THERE IS MODIFICATION IN HIM, THEN HIS WIERNALITY DISAPPEARS; AS 'MODIFICATION CONSISTS IN becoming changed into something else ; AND HOW COULD ANY SUCH CHANGE BE POSSIBLE IF THE SOUL REMAINED IN THE SAME CONDITION
ALWAYS ?-(294-295)
COMMENTARY
If the Soul is not made to undergo modification into Joy and Sorrow due to Pleasure and Pain and so forth, then he would be just like Alcāsha, and honce he cannot be the Enjoyer, and Primordial Matter also cannot be of any service to him,-[Buch is the construction of the Sentence]: because no service can be rendered to that which is unmodifiable.-It then, it be admitted that the Soul is modifiable,-then there is the undesirable contingency of his losing his eternality ; because what we mean by the 'Non-eternality of a thing is that it does not remain in the same form always; and as this would be there, if the Soul were modifiable, how could he be eternal ? As what is meant by "eternality' is that the thing should retain the same form always.
(294–295)
The following text provides another explanation of the Soul being the enjoyer from the standpoint of the other party :
