________________
(1) NYÄYA DOCTRINE OF THE 'SELF.
145
It might be urged that the said Cognition also mnst be apprehended by a Cogniser different from itself,-(a) because it is prone to appearance and disappearance, (b) because it is cognisable -(c) because it is capable of being remembered as a means of cognition,-like the objects of cogni. tion)".
But here also: (1) as there would be nothing to preclude the contrary of the Probandum, the negative concomitance would remain doubtful; (2) as it would involve cognition after cognition, there would be an infinite regress ;-(3) there would be no object whose appearance had not become manifested; hence, for the establishing of one object', it would be necessary to carry on a series of Cognitions, which would take up the entire life of a man.
If for fear of the infinito regress', some one cognition were accepted as appearing by itself,--then that one case would render doubtful and inconclusive the whole set of Reasons cited, in the form being liable to appearance and disappearance and the rest. Further, in that case, why should there be any aversion to the acceptance of the self-cognisability' of other cognitions also.-on the basis of that said one cognition If (in order to avoid this difficulty) it be held that the said one cognition is one whose form is not cognised at all ;-even so, that cognition not being un-proven', the entire set of cognitions preceding it would be not proven', --having their appearance not manifested; and as a consequence of this, the object (of cognition) also would be not proven':-Further, as regards the opinion of the Idealista,-under which all Cognitions are self-manifested, on account of their being no Cogniser' of Cognisable things, and are not manifested by any other Cognition,-the defect in the Opponent's reasoning, of being devoid of the Probandum' would remain absolutely unslaken.
In the same manner it may be pointed out that the other reasons'having its birth dependent upon Causes' and the rest,-aro open to the objection of being Futile and so forth.
[In the opening lines of the Commentary on 171-176, above, it has been Esserted by the Naiyāyilu that “all particular cognitions of such cognisables as are the objects of Being, etc. etc.");-herein the qualification that has been added to the subject of the Reasoning, is, as before, absolutely ukeless; as in the matter oi proving the Probandum in question, they do not render any help at all, Because what is there that does not become included under the subject thus qualified 1-sinco all my perceptional and other cognitions are declared to be apprehended by a cogniser other than the Body, sense organs and the rest. Even if a distinction were made on the basis of some cognitions being perceptional' and some 'inferential' and so on. -any distinction in regard to the Subject itself would be useless, ss all cognitions would have become included under the term ' my cognitions'.-Nor even for the opposite party is any such qualified Subject known ; hence the Reasons put forward are devoid of a substratum.-- If it is the case that by setting up a useless qualification, another reason is put forward for the proving of the said substratum,—then the reasoner becomes subject to the Clincher' of Arthân. tara', 'Irrelevancy'-by reasou of setting up something entirely unconnected with the thing under consideration. -(190)
10
