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(A) NYAYA DOCTRINE OF THE SELP'.
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specific changes, this is in accordance with the view that things are momentary; as the changes' meant here are those that are brought about on the sume spot where the constituent cause existed.-Both these kinds of 'receptacle' are impossible in the case of Desire and the rest; hence there can be na receptacle' for these.(193)
Under the argument urged above (in Text 178) the phrase "white being entities' has been introduced as a qualification this qualification is absolutely useless; as there is nothing that it can serve to exclude. This is what is pointed out in the following Text:
TEXT (194)
IT IS NOT REASONABLE TO REGARD DESTRUCTION, WHICH IS formlesa, AS A PRODUCT'; HENCE THE QUALIFICATION MENTIONED IN THE REASONING OF THE OTHER PARTY IS
ENTIRELY USELESS.-(194)
COMMENTARY.
If Destruction could be of the nature of a Product, then the qualification being an entity' would serve the purpose of excluding that as a matter of fact however, as it is a non-entity, causes cannot do anything to it; how the could it have a Cause This reusoning may be formulated As follows :-That which is a non-entity cannot be the product of anything, 0.g. the 'Hare's Horns'.-Destruction is a non-entity ;-hence to speak of it as having 4 cause would be contrary to the said universal proposition.If it were a product, it would be an entity, like Pleasure, etc.-This would be an argument against the reasoning of the other party.
Further, what has been asserted also runs counter to your own doctrine. For instance, the name and the idea of 'Product' is due-(a) to its acquiring its character, or (b) to its subsistence (manifestation) in its Material Cause, or (c) to the subsistence therein of Being' (existence)-Destruction is not possessed of the character of Substance, etc., hence it cannot subsist in its Material Cause ; nor, for the same reason, can Being (Existence) subsist in it (Destruction), for the simple reason that it has no form (wherein the Existence could subsist). If it were otherwise, then, like Substance, etc., it would also be contained in a receptacle, and be an 'Entity also ; and as such, it could not be excluded by the qualification in question; hence this qualification being entitios' is absolutely useless. — (194)
As against the argument put forward by the Opponent under Text 180 above, to the effect that 'the cognitions of Colour, etc. have one and several causes, etc. eto.',--the Author urges as follows:
