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(B) MİMĀMSÃ DOCTRINE OF THE 'SELF
175
TEXT (251).
BUT AS A MATTER OF FACT, THE COGNITIONS IN QUESTION HAVI NO SUCH CONNECTION WITH THAT PARTICULAR PLACE; WHY THEN SHOULD
THEY APPEAR IN THAT TORM AT THAT PLACE ?-(251)
COMMENTARY
When at a certain place, a number of individual objects actually appear as 'imposed upon Cognitions in a certain order of sequence,-there is no connection between the Cognition and those individual objects existing at other times and places, in the same order of sequence. Under the circuirstances, how is it that they appear in the form that is imposed upon them arbitrarily ? Certainly it cannot be right for one thing to appear in the form of another thing; if it were, then this would lead to incongruities; and in this way all Cognitions would come to have all tlings for their objects; and there would be an end to all ordered usage regarding things.—(251)
TEXT (252).
THEN AGAIN, UNDER YOUR VIEW, THE EXTERNAL FORM IS NOT DECLARED TO BELONG TO THE COGNITION; NOR ARE THE ELEPHANT, POLE AND OTHER THINGS ACTUALLY EXISTENT AT THE PLACE
DESIRED.—(252)
COMMENTARY
Then again, under your-Mimānsala's-view, the form that appears (in Cognition) does not belong to the Oognition ; as you assert that the Cognition is formless." What if it is so ?"-At the place desired etc. ; i.e. at the place where the imposition is made the Cognitions should appear as connected with that same time and place wherewith the said objectsElephant and the rest-are connected ;-how is it then that they appear at a time and place which are not connected with themselves and which are yet different from those with which the objects are connected ?-From this it follows that these Oognitions have no real basis, and they are, in reality, unmixed in character and mobile ; that they are so is due to the fact of their appearing only occasionally ;--and it also becomes established that the Soul, which is of the nature of the said Cognition, must also be evanescent and many.
The following might be urged :-"Cognition is a property of the Soul; hence the diversity of the Cognition need not imply diversity of the Soul, the latter being only an object having that property."
This cannot be right; Pratyaya' (Cognition), 'Chaitanya' (Sentience), Buddhi' (Intelligence), Iñana' (Knowledge) are all synonymous terins: nor does a mere difference in names make any difference in the nature of things. Further, even with a difference in their names, all these are actually
