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162
TATTVASANGRAHA : CHAPTER VII.
& wrong notion-If it were otherwise, when, when you proceed to put forward denials of the Buddhist's assumption of momentariness expressed in such words as 'The Lamp and the rest are momentary', - you would be open to the same objection ; because we never find any case where the negative is used without * term following it.
Then again, it has been assertedl - Who is there who holds that the Soul subsiste in the Body"-This also is not right; as there are some people who regard the Soul to be of the size of the half of the Thumb' or via Shyamála grain'; and under their view, the Soul, being a corporeal material substance, must be subsisting in the Body; and it is only right that the denial in question should be made against these people.
It has been alleged that "there is no Corroborative Instance in support of the denial of the Body being related to the Soul ”. - This is not true; as it is easy to prove, as shown above, that there can be no relationship between the Body and the Soul.-because one does not render any help to the other,-as between the Vindhya and the Himalaya mountains.
It has also been alleged that-"The denial of the particular implies the acceptance of the general". - This generalisation is not true; e.g. even though you deny the momentariness of the Lamp and other particular things, you do not accept the momentariness of anything in general.-It might be argued that "We do admit the applicability of the term 'momentary' to the Lamp and such things, on the basis of their not continuing to exist for a long time; so that in this way, momentariness in general may be regarded as admitted "-If it is so, the applicability of the term 'Soul' also to the Mind associated with 'I-consciousness' is admitted by us; and this may be regarded as the Soul in general being admitted.
The assertion of the two alternative views regarding the term Soul denoting something transient, etc. etc.-is not relevant ; for the simple reason that no such view has been held; nothing, in faet, has been held (by us) as to be really denoted by the term Soul'. Nor has any such object been admitted by us as is distinct from Colour, etc.. Nor again is the denotation of the term "Soul' admitted in regard to any eternal thing, which would falsify the said premiss.-Nor lastly can the use of the term Soul' in reference to the Body, etc. be regarded as figurative' (indirect);
because such use is never found to fail, as explained above. Hence there is no Superfluity' in our reasoning.-(220)
TEXT (221).
THUS THE SOUL' BEING SOMETHING NOT-PROVED, THE ENTIRE FABRIC (OF CONCEPTIONS) THAT HAS BEEN ADOPTED IN REGARD TO IT, BECOMES BASELESS LIKE THI SON OF THE BARREN
WOMAN',-(221)
COMMENTARY.
Thus, any such thing as the 'Soul' being found to be precluded by all means of Right Cognition, and hence not proved', 'not admissible
